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“A legitimate social order is one where everyday citizens perceive 
an obligation to obey legal authorities.” – Max Weber, Economy and 
Society (1968)1 
“The issues before the [District] Court do not require the Court to 
consider the public popularity, public acceptance, public acquiescence, 
or public disdain for the DAPA program.” – Judge Hanen in Texas v. 
United States preliminary injunction order (2015)2 
INTRODUCTION 
President Obama may be best remembered for his executive policies 
in health care, immigration, consumer protection, and the environment. 
Yet many of these policy legacies are tied up in litigation. Most 
significantly, recent uses of executive action in immigration law have 
triggered accusations that the President is acting imperially, like a king, 
or as a lawbreaker; they have also prompted Supreme Court review.3 The 
legal issues raise important issues of executive power and agency 
authority. Yet framing the disputes in terms of the lawsuits challenging 
them overlooks a critical aspect of executive policymaking that is more 
far-reaching and enduring: the legitimacy of the sources and authorities 
behind the executive actions.4 This Article reframes the executive action 
debates around the concept of legitimacy, using as a primary example 
President Obama’s executive actions in immigration law. The delineation 
of legitimacy and legality as analytically distinct concepts, even if related 
ones, provides a new way of thinking about executive policymaking. 
The legitimacy of laws has particular significance for the executive 
actions in immigration law. Having failed to achieve legislative changes 
in immigration law, the most noteworthy changes in immigration policy 
during this administration have been the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program and Deferred Action for Parental 
1. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). 
2. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-
40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
3. See id.; see, e.g., Athena Jones, Immigration Question: How Far Can the President
Go on Executive Actions?, CNN (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/07/politics/ 
obama-executive-actions/. 
4. See infra Part II.A (defining legitimacy).
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Accountability (DAPA). The programs provide temporary protection 
from deportation for undocumented immigrants who meet qualifying 
criteria.5 Both policies are the product of executive action and, as 
nonbinding federal policies, both programs depend on voluntary 
cooperation for their successful implementation.6 DACA and DAPA are 
similar in their purpose of providing lawful presence to qualifying 
individuals, though they differ in their eligibility criteria. States are nearly 
unanimous in their willingness to enact state laws and policies that permit 
undocumented immigrations with the DACA lawful presence designation 
to obtain driver’s licenses. At the same time, twenty-six states are 
challenging the President’s authority to issue DAPA in Texas v. United 
States, impeding the many benefits that would flow from it. How can we 
understand the seeming disconnect between on-the-ground support for 
DACA and high-level opposition to DAPA? 
This Article claims that lurking behind the impassioned political 
rhetoric is a profoundly important concern about whether the legal 
institutions that fostered DACA are worthy of trust and can inspire 
cooperation in the public officials who will implement it. While there is 
important literature focusing on the legality and politics of executive 
action, this is the first law review article to theorize the significance of 
legitimacy for executive action and to study it empirically.7 This 
5. See discussion infra Part I.A, Part IV. While “unauthorized” is sometimes preferred
and indeed more accurate for describing the undocumented immigrant population, the Article 
interchanges “undocumented” due to the prevalence of that term in the scholarship describing 
and studying this population. Similarly, deportation and removal interchange even though 
changes in immigration law make “removal” the more accurate term.  
6. There are many forms of executive action, which bear similarities and also important
differences such as whether the executive action is legally binding. President Obama’s 
immigration actions are not legally binding in this sense, unlike an executive order. See Naomi 
Cobb, Comment, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): A Non-Legislative Means 
to an End That Misses the Bull’s-Eye, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC.
JUST. 651, 655 (2013); Phillip Bump, Why John Boehner Is Really Suing Barack Obama, 
WASH. POST: FIX (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/ 
06/25/why-john-boehner-is-really-suing-barack-obama/?hpid=z5. 
7. The closest examples are the sociological studies of Emily Ryo, although her studies
focus on individual rather than institutional attitudes toward immigration law. See, e.g., Emily 
Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 622, 627 (2015) [hereinafter Ryo, Less Enforcement]; Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: 
Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 574, 582 (2013)
[hereinafter Ryo, Deciding to Cross]. Both skeptics and supporters of studying legitimacy
empirically note the rarity of the effort. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Redirecting Social Studies
of Law, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 805, 822 (1980); Kenneth E. Boulding, The Impact of the Draft
on the Legitimacy of the National State, in WHERE IT’S AT: RADICAL PERSPECTIVES IN
SOCIOLOGY 509, 509 (S.E. Deutch & J. Howard eds., 1970) (“One of the most neglected
aspects of the dynamics of society is the study of dynamic processes which underlie the rise
and fall of legitimacy.”); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy:
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approach presents a way of understanding executive action in 
immigration law that will endure beyond the current litigation and 
legislative attacks. Executive action is not noteworthy because it is a new 
phenomenon, but the legal challenges to it illuminate a form of 
lawmaking that is often misunderstood. Contestation reveals persistent, 
if perplexing, features of law and policymaking that become clearer when 
studied as they operate on the ground, rather than in courts alone. 
This Article also fills a gap in legal scholarship on executive action 
by considering the far reach of federal policy. Whereas most of the legal 
discussion around DACA and DAPA focuses on federal law, this Article 
highlights state policies that incorporate federal policy elements from 
DACA. Some studies of immigration federalism and DACA 
implementation are emerging that reveal the multiple sites of immigration 
policymaking.8 This Article is unusual among them because it highlights 
the institutional dynamics of policymaking that emerge from interactions 
between state and federal law, rather than the substantive choice of state 
or federal law. The state policies that incorporate the DACA lawful 
presence designation represent sites for studying the process of 
cooperation. The qualitative study design focuses on the inputs into 
policymaking (attitudes of legitimacy, legality, and policy preferences 
that influence voluntary cooperation) and also the outputs of the decision-
making process (a spectrum of cooperative behavior). 
Bringing legitimacy and cooperative policymaking together, 
legitimacy becomes an important ingredient in eliciting a state’s 
voluntary cooperation when federal policy cannot legally compel it. This 
insight has practical implications for cooperation between state and 
federal government in immigration policymaking. Thus, this Article is an 
example of scholarship that leads directly to a policy recommendation: 
presidential administrations should consider the fairness of the 
procedures they use to design and implement federal programs, and they 
should take steps to encourage voluntary cooperation from states and 
ordinary citizens rather than relying on legal mandates, even if they are 
Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8 L. & POL’Y 257, 258 (1986) (noting the virtual absence of 
empirical examination of legitimacy); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776 (2001) (“Legitimacy is a word often used in our political debate, but
seldom defined precisely.”).
8. Immigration federalism studies state laws in relationship to federal law, but it often
presumes conflict rather than cooperation. Implementation studies look at changes in a 
uniform federal law when implemented in multiple states, rather than the states’ laws. See, 
e.g., Shannon Gleeson & Els de Graauw, An Institutional Examination of Varying Local
Approaches to Implementing DACA (2015) (unpublished paper presented at Law & Society
Association Annual Meeting) (on file with author); Joseph Benjamin Landau, Bureaucratic
Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
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not legally required to do so. Crafting legitimate executive policies 
enhances credibility and authority, smooths the way for more successful 
policymaking, and ultimately burnishes the Obama Administration’s 
policy legacy—especially where the President’s substantive goals may 
be contested in a legally or politically charged environment. 
Part I of this Article explains executive action in immigration law. 
It begins with a sketch of the undocumented immigrant population and 
describes immigration law’s primary response: an assemblage of 
executive actions granting deferred action to postpone deportation and 
permit work during a period of lawful presence. It then describes two 
frameworks for assessing executive action. The legal framework analyzes 
DACA’s legality as a constitutional and statutory matter. The legitimacy 
framework analyzes DACA in a manner consistent with socio-legal 
research on cooperation. Part II defines legitimacy and explains its 
relationship to state cooperation. Part III presents case studies of state 
decisions to incorporate the DACA lawful presence designation into their 
state policies. It examines state policies that provide DACA recipients 
with driver’s licenses, higher education, and health care. The 
comparisons highlight the varying justifications for state cooperation, 
despite disparate viewpoints of the underlying policies and of 
immigration enforcement. Part IV compares the broad acceptance of 
DACA in the states with the pointed legal challenge to the DAPA 
program in Texas v. United States. The comparison of DACA and DAPA 
teases out the limits of legitimacy as a motivation for voluntary 
cooperation. This Article concludes with reflections on how presidential 
administrations can build support for, or undermine, their executive 
actions. 
I. UNDERSTANDING EXECUTIVE ACTION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Uses of executive action in immigration policymaking are
“ascendant.”9 Because the immigration policy landscape has been 
marked by a stalemate in Congress for more than a decade, the Obama 
Administration’s immigration policy has largely emerged in the 
executive branch.10 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
is the federal agency responsible for enforcing federal immigration laws. 
Through DHS, President Obama in 2012 announced the DACA program 
9. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 223 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, Redux]. 
10. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
SINCE 9/11, at 14 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
RMSG-post-9-11policy.pdf.  
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that provides qualifying, undocumented, immigrant youth temporary 
protection from deportation and furnishes them with lawful presence—
as distinguished from lawful immigration status—for two years.11 
President Obama’s 2014 executive action, DAPA, expanded the criteria 
for deferred action to cover the undocumented parents of U.S. citizens 
and legal permanent residents (LPRs).12 The 2014 package of reforms 
used similar measures to benefit military families and high-skilled 
workers and their spouses; it also revamped immigration enforcement 
practices used to transfer immigrants with criminal convictions from jails 
into civil removal proceedings. 
While there is a well-pedigreed scholarship on the presidency and 
the executive branch, most of it does not adequately theorize executive 
action in immigration law.13 Scholarship on executive action often 
analyzes isolated judicial doctrines concerning discrete legal questions 
rather than viewing executive action as part of a broader phenomenon of 
lawmaking. For example, inquiry into whether President Obama was 
acting within his powers when he announced DACA is marked by close 
analysis of the Take Care Clause and a few landmark cases on 
enforcement discretion.14 Another strand of inquiry homes in on the legal 
11. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was announced by President
Obama and subsequently issued as a directive by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano on June 
15, 2012. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec., to David 
V. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1–3 (June 15, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter Napolitano Memo June 2012].
12. DACA was expanded to create the DAPA program by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
on November 20, 2014. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland 
Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 1–5 (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action 
.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo Nov. 2014]. DAPA is currently enjoined as a result of the 
Texas v. United States litigation. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), 
aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 
207257. 
13. Notable exceptions that examine executive authority and immigration law in their
broader context occur in the scholarship of HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE
LAW (2014); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration 
Law]; Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 9; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick 
Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016). 
14. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031, 1117–19 (2013). But see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 759–61 (2014); Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The 
Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the 
Take Care Clause, 71 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of 
DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 234–37 (2015) 
[hereinafter Blackman Part II]. 
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effect of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s DACA memos as 
an exercise of congressionally-delegated authority15 and its compliance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking 
procedures.16 While these legal questions are important and will be 
consequential for law and policy, this style of scholarship resembles a 
legal brief for or against DACA. It offers a valuable guide for the 
resolution of current lawsuits, but it does not recognize that legal analysis 
will not by itself resolve debates over the legitimacy of executive 
lawmaking in the regulatory state. 
My contribution to the conversation around executive action is to 
situate challenges to DACA in a more enduring theoretical frame. This 
theoretical framework centers on legitimacy and relates it to state policies 
that voluntarily cooperate with federal law. Part I.A describes the 
background for understanding the use of deferred action in immigration 
law. Part I.B synthesizes the two legal arguments that dominate public 
discussion of DACA and identifies their inadequacies as a framework for 
understanding immigration debates. Part I.C reorients the DACA analysis 
around legitimacy, providing tools to conceptualize and measure 
voluntary cooperation with DACA in state policymaking. 
A. Executive Action as a Response to Undocumented Immigration
Immigration law generally requires that immigrants seeking entry to
the United States demonstrate and maintain their eligibility for 
admission.17 Those who enter without inspection lack authorization from 
the U.S. government; so do those who properly acquire a visa document 
that later lapses, e.g. if they overstay or violate the terms of their visa. 
The breadth of these statutory violations relative to the immigration 
15. A U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memo focuses on
congressionally-delegated power in its positive evaluation of DACA and DAPA. The Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the 
U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C., Nov. 19, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-
removal.pdf [hereinafter OLC Memo]; cf. Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive 
Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 
1183 (2015).  
16. See Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law, 91 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: 
Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 96 (2015) [hereinafter 
Blackman Part I]; Michael W. McConnell, Why Obama’s Immigration Order Was Blocked, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-mcconnell-why-obamas-
immigration-order-was-blocked-1424219904. 
17. Individuals are ineligible for citizenship if they are either inadmissible or deportable 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). See Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).  
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system’s ability to keep pace creates a sizeable population of 
undocumented immigrants, currently estimated to be approximately 11.3 
million.18 While some of these individuals are eligible for relief from 
removal, most are subject to civil detention and removal. The DHS is 
largely responsible for deciding who belongs in which category, an 
essential part of their enforcement activities. Some call the post hoc 
system of sorting among those eligible for removal a de facto delegation 
of enforcement.19 
Deportations of certain segments of the undocumented immigrant 
population have until recently been on the rise, with a historic high of 
about 400,000 deportations under President Obama in 2012.20 But even 
at this high level of deportation, with current levels of funding sufficing 
only to deport four percent of the population each year, it would take 
more than thirty years to deport all 11.3 million undocumented 
immigrants—thirty years for the existing population and possibly longer 
once adjusting for inflows and outflows of undocumented immigrants 
during that thirty-year period. 
Faced with a gap between the size of the undocumented immigrant 
population and the resources required to remove them all, the Department 
of Homeland Security sets enforcement priorities to guide its removal 
practices. Along with its predecessor agency, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the DHS since the 1970s has issued a series of 
agency policy documents setting out criteria for prioritizing their 
18. Jeffrey S. Passel et al., As Growth Stalls, Unauthorized Immigration Population
Becomes More Settled, PEW RES. CTR.: HISP. TRENDS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www. 
pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-population-becomes-
more-settled/; see also MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 3 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf (11.5 million). In reality, estimates of the 
undocumented immigrant population are difficult because many of them evade government 
detection. 
19. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 13, at 511
(crediting the Congress-President mismatch said to produce de facto discretion over 
immigration enforcement); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 13. Deeper causes for such a large 
undocumented immigrant population may include historical patterns of U.S.-Mexico 
migration, economic conditions that prompt migrants to seek a better life elsewhere, and 
social conditions that sustain unauthorized migration or impede cyclical return-reentry. See, 
e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS (2004); Wayne Cornelius, Controlling ‘Unwanted’
Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1994–2003, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD.
775 (2005); Kevin Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 249 (2003).
20. FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key
Priorities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/ 
news/releases/fy-2011-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-focus-key-
priorities#wcm-survey-target-id; Passel et al., supra note 18. 
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enforcement activities.21 These deferred action memoranda list positive 
and negative factors for evaluating the cases of individual immigrants 
facing deportation, generally raising the priority level for removable 
immigrants with criminal records or who pose a danger to the community, 
and lowering the priority for those without criminal records or who 
contribute positively to the community and demonstrate stakes in the 
community. While each of the DHS’s deferred action memos varies in its 
particulars and its emphasis, the memos constitute a consistent set of 
agency priorities over several administrations. 
Consistent with these longstanding priorities, President Obama’s 
DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano, issued a guidance document in 2012 
that makes explicit the agency’s discretionary considerations.22 What 
changed in the guidance is the centralization of the process for 
considering applications from a subset of immigrants, those long-time 
residents who crossed the border at a young age and have since 
contributed positively to their communities. The DACA selection criteria 
track affirmative and negative criteria from prior memos, even though the 
applications remain subject to the individual determinations of DHS’s 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials. The DACA 
2012 program made approximately 2.5 million people eligible for 
deferred action, with approximately 750,000 having received the benefit 
so far and eighty-three percent of those having renewed.23 The primary 
justification for the program is that young immigrants who entered with 
their families should not bear responsibility for their actions.24 DHS 
Secretary Jeh Johnson’s 2014 memos on prosecutorial discretion and 
deferred action expand the qualifying criteria for deferred action. The 
21. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015). 
22. See Napolitano Memo June 2012, supra note 11, at 1.
23. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CONSIDERATION OF DACA BY FISCAL
YEAR, QUARTER INTAKE, BIOMETRICS, AND CASE STATUS: 2012–2015, at 1 (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immi
gration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_performancedata_fy2015
_qtr1.pdf.; Angelo Mathay & Margie McHugh, DACA at the Three-Year Mark: High Pace of 
Renewals, But Processing Difficulties Evident (Aug. 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
research/daca-three-year-mark-high-pace-renewals-processing-difficulties-evident.  
24. Obama’s Comments after Secretary Napolitano’s announcement on June 15, 2012:
They were brought to this country by their parents—sometimes even as infants—and
often have no idea that they’re undocumented until they apply for a job or a driver’s
license, or a college scholarship.
Put yourself in their shoes. Imagine you’ve done everything right your entire life . . .
only to suddenly face the threat of deportation to a country that you know nothing
about, with a language that you may not even speak.
Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. 
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2014 DACA expansion lifted an age cap for immigrant youth and made 
an additional one million people eligible for deferred action, and the 
corollary DAPA program for parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs would 
make yet another two to three million people eligible.25 
In addition to the temporary protection from deportation, deferred 
action furnishes lawful presence while remaining in the United States. 
While lawful presence falls short of lawful status,26 it does make the 
recipient temporarily eligible for certain benefits. Among the advantages 
of DACA is the ability to obtain temporary work authorization.27 The 
Employment Authorization Document (EAD) that accompanies work 
authorization renders the immigrant in compliance with laws that might 
otherwise impede employment. While the EAD does not undo laws 
prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring undocumented workers,28 
it makes it possible to obtain lawful work. Other benefits associated with 
lawful presence include: a social security number and the possibility of 
obtaining a state driver’s license, in-state college tuition rates, and limited 
health care coverage, depending on the state laws where one resides.29 
This background section depicts executive action as immigration 
law’s pragmatic response to the undocumented population. The spare 
facts set up two frameworks for theorizing executive action: legality and 
legitimacy. 
25. See Johnson Memo Nov. 2014, supra note 12, at 3. Texas v. United States, 86 F.
Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 
2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
26. Those with lawful presence are not undocumented in the conventional sense, nor
do they possess the full benefits of lawful status. See Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of 
Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2015) (explaining the “paradoxical middle ground 
between legality and illegality,” and exploring the impact that living in nonstatus has on 
immigrants in the United States).  
27. The DHS 2012 and 2014 deferred action memos rely on Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) section 274A and its implementing regulations for DACA work 
authorization. Napolitano Memo June 2012, supra note 11; Johnson Memo Nov. 2014, supra 
note 12. INA section 274A grants the executive branch authority to determine which aliens 
are granted employment authorization, INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3) (2012); the 
corresponding regulation CFR § 274A names those with deferred action as eligible for work 
authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015). Subsequent forms such as the revised Form 
I-795 application for an EAD that includes a specific code for DACA beneficiaries and
inclusion of a DACA EAD for verifying I-9 eligibility to work are used for implementation.
See INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1324a(h)(3) (“[T]he term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with
respect to the employment of an alien . . . that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or
by the Attorney General.” (emphasis added)); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (specifically
authorizing USCIS to issue work permits to recipients of deferred action provided they
demonstrate economic necessity).
28. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
29. See infra Part III.
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B. Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding Executive Action
Although this Article ultimately argues that legal arguments are
inadequate for understanding the real controversy, some legal 
background is needed to define and distinguish legality from the 
alternative of legitimacy. 
A primary source of legal controversy around deferred action 
concerns the constitutional sources of executive power and its constraints. 
Constitutional sources such as Article II’s Vesting Clause state: “The 
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”30 
Article II’s Take Care Clause states: “[The President] shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed”31 and has been interpreted both to impose 
a duty on the President and to constitute a source of executive power to 
exercise discretion in the enforcement of law. Executive authority also 
extends from the “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct 
relations with foreign nations.”32 As applied in the immigration context, 
the plenary power doctrine reinforces the strength of the executive by 
reserving immigration decisions to the “political branches,”33 a 
proposition reaffirmed in the Arizona v. United States Supreme Court 
decision recognizing the federal government’s broad enforcement 
discretion in immigration.34 
President Obama’s 2012 DACA and 2014 DAPA programs 
constitute executive action backed by implementing guidance from the 
USCIS. As the Obama Administration explains, DACA draws primarily 
on the executive branch’s prerogative of setting enforcement priorities 
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
31. Id. § 3. The tension between these two interpretations can be seen in the Texas v.
United States challenge to DAPA. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 
2015), aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 
WL 207257. See infra Part IV.A for more discussion of the litigation. 
32. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
33. Foundational plenary power cases state that “over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [immigration].” Fiallo v. Bell, 
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Sea Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 
(1909)). The term “plenary power doctrine” was coined by Professor Stephen H. Legomsky 
in Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV.
255, 255 (1984) (describing the rise of the doctrine and rationales the Supreme Court has used 
to justify it, then critiquing those rationales). See also Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and 
Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7 (David A. Martin 
& Peter H. Schuck eds. 2005). “Political branches” typically refers to Congress, though some 
say the term could also refer to the presidency.  
34. See 132 S. Ct. at 2498. This interpretation also appears in the OLC Memo, supra
note 15, at 5, in the immigration professor letters cited infra notes 54 and 248, and scholarship 
on presidential power in immigration supra note 3.  
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under Heckler v. Chaney.35 The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum explains that the President was 
within his inherent powers in deciding on enforcement priorities that 
focus on criminals and gang members and safeguard the children of 
undocumented immigrants36—as President Obama put it in his 
November 2014 announcement—on “[f]elons, not families.”37 The OLC 
brief acknowledges important limitations on the exercise of executive 
power, given that the “open-ended nature of the inquiry under the Take 
Care Clause—whether a particular exercise of discretion is ‘faithful[] to 
the law enacted by Congress’—does not lend itself easily to the 
application of set formulas or bright-line rules.”38 Critics of the 
immigration executive actions claim that President Obama’s use of 
executive authority exceeds these limits and instead constitutes a 
“sweeping” assertion of executive power that borders on breaking the 
law.39 
35. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
36. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 4. As the OLC Memo explains:
[T]he “faithful[]” execution of the law does not necessarily entail “act[ing] against
each technical violation of the statute” that an agency is charged with enforcing.
Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Chaney, the decision whether to initiate
enforcement proceedings is a complex judgment that calls on the agency to
“balanc[e] . . . a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
37. Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/ 
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.  
38. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 5 (alteration in original). The OLC memo says that,
in general, limits on enforcement discretion are implied in the Constitution’s allocation of 
governmental powers between the two political branches. The OLC memo offers four limiting 
principles based on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), 
governing the permissible scope of enforcement discretion: (1) The decision to decline 
enforcement should reflect factors peculiarly within the enforcing agency’s expertise; (2) A 
program may not effectively rewrite the laws in the guise of exercising enforcement 
discretion; the action must be consonant with broad congressional policy underlying the 
regulatory statute; (3) The program cannot be so extreme as to amount to abdication of 
statutory responsibilities; and (4) Non-enforcement decisions are “most comfortably” 
sustained when they are done on a case-by-case basis. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 5–6. 
39. Price, supra note 14, at 760–62; see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 14, at 784; Peter
Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105 (2013). Challenges to 
executive authority are also presented in Complaint for Declarative & Injunctive Relief at 2, 
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00254), 
aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 
207257. The plaintiff-states in Texas v. United States characterized DAPA as a sweeping 
assertion and insinuated that it breaks the law during oral argument. See Oral Argument, 
Texas v. United States, No. 5-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (No. 15-
40238); see also Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 190 (D. D.C. 2014) (challenging 
DAPA and DACA on similar grounds), aff’d, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Crane v. Johnson, 
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The executive branch also enjoys delegated authority from 
Congress. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA) 
established a comprehensive scheme governing immigration and 
naturalization that includes specific criteria for admission and deportation 
(or removal) of noncitizens.40 For the enforcement of the statute, courts 
recognize that immigration statutes grant broad discretion over 
immigration enforcement to DHS. The Obama Administration’s legal 
analysis locates its delegated authority for deferred action in section 103 
of the INA, which authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
“perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his 
authority under the provisions of this chapter.”41 The breadth of the 
statutory language also suggests implied delegation (or de facto 
delegation) provided that the executive’s exercise of this delegated 
authority is consistent with Congress’s priorities for enforcement.42 The 
OLC and most legal experts agree that the programs fit within Congress’s 
priorities,43 although some critics claim that Congress’s failure to enact 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act 
783 F.3d 244, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2015) (challenging DACA on similar grounds). 
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012); INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182; INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227;
INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103; see also 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (Homeland Security Act of 2005’s 
general grant of discretion); OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 4–5.  
41. INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103. The statutory language in the INA references the
Attorney General, but these references are interpreted as being to the DHS Secretary 
following reorganization of the INS into the DHS. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Congress has 
recognized deferred action by name in several other immigration statutes as well. INA § 
237(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(2) (saying that if a person is ordered removed, applies for a 
temporary stay of removal, and is denied, that denial does not preclude the person applying 
for deferred action); INA § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) 
(2012) (authorizing deferred action for certain domestic violence victims and their children). 
It is also named in the REAL ID Act as a qualification for a driver’s license. 49 U.S.C. § 
30301 note (2012) (Improved Security for Drivers’ Licenses and Personal Identification 
Cards); Memorandum from Stephen H. Legomsky, Professor, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Legal Authorities for DACA and Similar Programs 1 (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/11/17/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/ 
executive%20action%20legal%20points.pdf. 
42. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 9, at 130–35. Implied delegation is a
familiar principle of statutory construction. While it underlies the de facto delegation, Cox 
and Rodríguez say it is difficult to discern legislative intent from de facto delegation. Id. at 
42. 
43. For examples of Congress’s priorities, consider that Congress states that
enforcement should be directed at “identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime 
by the severity of that crime” and the 2012 and 2014 DHS Secretary memos on enforcement 
priorities reflect this priority. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 10 (citing DHS Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 247, 251 (2014)). Also, the INA expressly grants 
discretionary relief for a variety of humanitarian purposes, including family unity, and DACA 
and DAPA focus on childhood arrivals and parents for similar reasons. Id. 
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legislation indicates a contrary intention.44 
A second area of legal inquiry concerns the DHS’ adherence to 
administrative procedure in its exercise of rulemaking authority. The 
APA requires that an agency provide notice and accept comments on 
proposed rules and regulations that would be legally binding.45 An 
exception exists for agency interpretations in the form of general 
statements of policy or interpretations, which do not by themselves 
constitute substantive rules.46 The DACA memo expressly states that it 
is not subject to APA procedural requirements because it is a policy, 
consisting of longstanding criteria used to guide individualized 
determinations of applications even if DHS renders decisions on a case-
by-case basis and reserves the ability to depart from the criteria if deemed 
in the federal interest.47 DAPA is even more discretionary because its 
eligibility criteria include a proviso that applicants “present no other 
factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred 
action inappropriate.”48 Both memos contend that they rely on separate 
regulations for work authorization and associated benefits.49 However, 
the legal standards for distinguishing nonbinding and binding agency 
interpretations are unclear,50 and the judicial doctrines for determining 
deference to such agency interpretations are similarly “muddled.”51 
Moreover, critics question whether the DACA program adheres to its 
stated limitations, noting the ninety-five percent grant rate,52 and claim 
44. The DREAM Act refers to legislation that would provide relief from deportation
and a pathway to citizenship for undocumented youth. Various bills containing DREAM Acts 
have been proposed in Congress from 2006 to 2010, but none have received bicameral 
support. Eligible youth have taken the name “DREAMer” in their social movements. 
45. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
46. Id. § 553(d).
47. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 7, 11.
48. Johnson Memo Nov. 2014, supra note 12, at 4.
49. See supra note 27 (discussing INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012), and its
implementing regulations work authorization). 
50. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 916–17
(2004); William Funk, When Is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between 
Nonlegislative and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 662 (2002); William Funk, A 
Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1324–25 (2001). 
51. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005). Some scholars point out that DACA’s 
binding effect is more questionable than a notice and comment regulation given the muddled 
doctrines for judicial deference to guidance post-Mead and contradictions between separation 
of powers and regulatory preemption analysis. Another issue is the presumptive non-
reviewability for prosecutorial discretion. 
52. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DATA SET: FORM 
I821D DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2015), https://www.ice.gov/news/ 
releases/fy-2011-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities 
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that the work authorization associated with DACA lawful presence is a 
“substantive benefit” inappropriate for promulgation via guidance.53 
* * *
Scrutiny of the legal foundations for the Obama Administration’s 
deferred action programs persists. Assuredly, rulings on the legality of 
deferred action matter for their own sake: they will be consequential for 
law and policy, and many experts have offered their legal analysis in 
support54 or critique.55 Yet the relationship between legality and 
legitimacy also merits close attention. Legal claims about executive 
authority give rise to analysis of the respect-worthiness of institutional 
authority, not just constitutional analysis. Legal claims about compliance 
with administrative procedure give rise to fairness and trustworthiness, 
not just APA analysis. In other words, the legality of DACA matters 
because it is interrelated with DACA’s legitimacy—in sometimes 
complementary, sometimes contradictory, and sometimes constitutive 
ways. 
II. FROM LEGALITY TO LEGITIMACY
In the context of this Article, the concept of legitimacy is defined as 
recognition that the executive branch’s authority to govern is appropriate, 
proper, and just. This definition is based on classical conceptions of 
legitimacy originating with Max Weber. Weber defines a legitimate 
social order as one where everyday citizens perceive an obligation to 
obey legal authorities.56 In this formulation, the perception of the binding 
#wcm-survey-target-id. 
53. Whether or not work authorization constitutes a substantive benefit is subject to
dispute in the Texas v. United States lawsuit challenging DAPA. See, e.g., Margulies, supra 
note 15, at 1184; Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 9, at 206. In reply, Obama claims the 
high grant rate is due to the self-selection of DACA applicants. Obama also claims that work 
authorization is independently provided for by regulations that followed APA rulemaking 
procedures and have been traditionally recognized by Congress and the courts. 
54. Constitutional scholars who wrote to support the President’s exercise of executive
discretion under the Take Care Clause include Lee Bollinger, Erwin Chemerinsky, Walter 
Dellinger, Harold Koh, Gillian Metzger, Eric Posner, Cristina Rodríguez, David Strauss, 
Geoffrey Stone, and Lawrence Tribe. See, e.g., Letter from Lee C. Bollinger et al. (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://thehill.com/sites/default/files/scholars_letter_on_immigration_2_1.pdf. 
Immigration law professors wrote to the President on numerous occasions, beginning with 
Letter from Hiroshi Motomura et al., to Barack Obama, U.S. President (May 28, 2012), 
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (regarding executive authority to grant administrative 
relief for DREAM Act beneficiaries). For purposes of disclosure, I was one of 136 law 
professors who signed the initial letter outlining the President’s legal authority to take 
executive action on immigration.  
55. Margulies, supra note 15; Blackman Part I, supra note 16; Blackman Part II, supra
note 14. 
56. See WEBER, supra note 1.
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and obligatory quality of a law motivates citizens to obey: “Action . . . 
may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order. . . . 
Only . . . will an order be called ‘valid’ if . . . it is in some appreciable 
way regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or exemplary for 
him.”57 Socio-legal scholars extend this definition to the study of legal 
compliance. For example, numerous studies in law, sociology, and social 
psychology (frequently inspired by Tom Tyler, a social psychologist 
situated within a law school), begin with the premise that “legitimacy is 
the belief that the law and agents of the law are rightful holders of 
authority; that they have the right to dictate appropriate [behavior] and 
are entitled to be obeyed; and that laws should be obeyed simply because 
that is the right thing to do.”58 Legal theorists also contextualize 
legitimacy within their more doctrinally-oriented studies, with the 
exemplary scholarship of Richard Fallon and Bruce Ackerman analyzing 
Supreme Court opinions for their social acceptance and not merely their 
operation in courts.59 The next sections define legitimacy in greater 
detail. They first use Fallon’s tripartite definition and then operationalize 
the definition for empirical study using Tyler’s measures. 
A. Defining Legitimacy
This Article substantially builds on Fallon’s tripartite disaggregation 
of the concept of “legitimacy” in order to forge its own definitional 
distinctions: legality, legitimacy, and morality.60 The first view of law as 
legality, building on Fallon’s legal legitimacy, is a positivist one that 
asserts the mere existence of duly-enacted law compels obedience. The 
second concept of legitimacy, building on Fallon’s sociological 
legitimacy, is the one that this Article most focuses on. It is an internal 
definition that recognizes people require more than an assertion of 
legality to obey the law. Importantly, the willingness to voluntarily 
cooperate with trustworthy authorities and fair procedures is a signal of 
perceived legitimacy rather than an incontrovertible claim. The third 
concept of morality, building on Fallon’s moral legitimacy, requires that 
57. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L.
REV. 379, 381–82 (1983) (quoting WEBER, supra note 1, at 31). 
58. Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply With the Law? Legitimacy and the
Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1053 (2012); TOM TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, OBEY]; TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE 6 (2011) [hereinafter TYLER, COOPERATE]. 
59. See generally BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 
2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792 
(2005). 
60. Fallon, supra note 59, at 1794 (describing three concepts of legitimacy). For more
discussion of the three uses and their relationships, see infra Part IV. 
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a law is respect-worthy according to an external, moral criterion. For 
reasons that will be explained later, in this Article, morality tracks 
substantive policy preferences, as opposed to partisan preferences.61 
It is difficult to maintain sharp distinctions between these three 
senses of legitimacy in the presence of overlapping and mixed 
motivations.62 For example, a person might view a policy as legitimate, 
at least in part, because a credible government authority issued it—for 
example, it came from a duly-elected president—or because a court with 
sound motives affirmed its lawfulness. That person may additionally 
believe that the policy is immoral, even if he accepts that it adheres to 
current law and was enacted under fair procedures. In this example, 
legality and legitimacy shore up one another, whereas legitimacy and 
morality are at odds. Each element is important so that neither legitimacy, 
legality, nor morality is enough to determine a state’s rationale for 
adopting a policy. Still the concepts are analytically distinct from one 
another, even if they are related and sometimes intertwined. 
Legitimacy is worthy of consideration in its own right and in 
relationship to the other strands of the concept. In its own right, 
legitimacy is integral and often submerged in discussions about legality. 
This is particularly true in studies of constitutional and administrative 
law, which have a rich heritage of investigating the theoretical 
foundations and normative justifications for their legal authority.63 But 
legality sometimes matters even more for its effect on popular 
perceptions of legitimacy than for its own sake. This is because 
“sociological acceptance is a necessary condition for a constitution or 
legal system to exist at all.”64 People must believe that the laws are fairly 
administered and that the authorities are trustworthy. Controversial 
61. See infra text accompanying notes 128–29.
62. Hyde, supra note 57, at 382.
63. Scholarship exposing the chronic legitimacy crisis of the regulatory state supports
this analysis. See, e.g., JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 9–11 (1978); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). But see Adrian Vermeule, No: Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2015) (book review). A sample of Constitutional theory on the 
rule of law and the relationship and legality and legitimacy is contained in Bruce Ackerman’s 
edited volume. See, e.g., Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live 
with Bush v. Gore, in BUSH V. GORE, supra note 59, at 97–98 (describing Constitutional law 
as an effort to abstract stable and enduring principles from politics); Jack M. Balkin, 
Legitimacy and the 2000 Election, in BUSH V. GORE, supra note 59, at 214–15 (resting 
political legitimacy on trust and confidence and not merely on related but distinct “procedural 
niceties”). Importantly, these reflections on problems of legitimacy often presuppose an ideal 
of judicial independence, whereas the executive power I study emanates from a president who 
is not required to be independent in the sense of apolitical. 
64. Fallon, supra note 59, at 1791 n.7.
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decisions are followed by a process of “[a]nxious reappraisal, followed 
slowly by a consensus on how the system performed.”65 If the decision is 
positive, the system is praised; if it is negative, “a gnawing sense of 
illegitimacy eats away at the fabric of mutual confidence.”66 The point 
pertains as much to executive action as judicial decisions. Building on the 
point that legal contentions about the DHS’s executive authority 
“depends much more on [their] present sociological acceptance . . . than 
upon the legality of [their] formal ratification,”67 this Article focuses on 
the reappraisal as a process of sociological acceptance. This acceptance 
can be seen in ordinary citizens or in state policymaking that responds to 
executive action. Examining deferred action through the lens of states 
prioritizes the bottom-up perceptions of those who interpret, implement, 
and abide by executive action. 
B. Operationalizing Legitimacy
An advantage of focusing on the sociological strand is that the 
choice lends itself to an empirical study of legitimacy. This empirical gain 
offsets the unavoidable losses of simplifying a complex concept. An 
empirical examination of legitimacy presupposes observable indicia of 
the beliefs and behaviors associated with legitimacy, once again defined 
as a willingness to follow the law. These signals are operationalized as 
attitudes of acceptance and cooperative behaviors. This Article 
substantially emulates the attitudinal measures associated with 
acceptance and cooperative behavior in Tom Tyler’s and his 
collaborators’ research in its efforts to place Fallon’s definitional 
distinctions within an empirical framework. 
Tyler’s seminal work on legitimacy empirically examines the 
motivations of people who comply with the law. In Why People Obey the 
Law, Tyler interviewed more than 1500 people about their motivations 
for complying with a range of laws.68 Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
Tyler finds that people obey laws for reasons beyond their instrumental 
fear of punishment or their desire to obtain a benefit.69 They also factor 
in their normative beliefs about the legitimacy of the legal system that 
rendered the legal outcome.70 The normative belief in legitimacy is 
65. Bruce Ackerman, Introduction to BUSH V. GORE, supra note 59, at vii.
66. Id. at viii.
67. Fallon, supra note 59, at 1792.
68. TYLER, OBEY, supra note 58, at 4–5, 40–56.
69. TYLER, OBEY, supra note 58, at 20–22 (explaining that traditional social theory
assumes behavior is instrumentally motivated and challenging the view that it is the sole 
factor). 
70. TYLER, OBEY, supra note 58, at 22–27, 57–62 (explaining the alternative idea that
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influenced by their perception of fairness and procedural justice—
whether the rule is duly enacted, is fairly administered and their sense 
that the officials involved are trustworthy.71 Other normative motivations 
might also include a sense that the law corresponds to one’s own values 
and substantive policy preferences.72 The persistent finding in Tyler’s 
and others’ studies is that people are more willing to cooperate with the 
law if they believe the legal authorities are trustworthy and that it is 
administered fairly.73 Policymakers must think about the procedures used 
to promulgate the law and the people called upon to implement it, not 
merely the substance of their policies. 
The behavioral measure of legitimacy can be seen in conduct that 
conforms with the law’s requirements—in this Article, state 
policymaking that incorporates federal requirements. These cooperative 
policymaking behaviors vary across a spectrum of compliance behaviors 
ranging from total commitment, to more reluctant or begrudging 
acceptance, to foot dragging and resistance. Voluntary cooperation 
extends the compliance spectrum. Going beyond compliance, Tyler, in 
subsequent work, identifies cooperation as a behavior linked with 
compliance.74 As opposed to involuntary compliance, sometimes 
motivated by the threat of legal enforcement, voluntary cooperation is 
motivated by norms that operate apart from sanction or detection.75 The 
extent of voluntary cooperation may even exceed legal requirements. For 
example, private organizations sometimes adopt even more rigorous 
legitimacy makes an independent contribution to compliance and presenting evidence for it). 
71. Id. at 115.
72. Id.
73. Id. Major empirical studies of legitimacy have been conducted in: policing, Tom R.
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 84, 84 
(2004); criminal law, Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Future Challenges in the Study of 
Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (Justice Tankebe 
& Alison Liebling eds., 2013); tax law, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to 
Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 615 (2007); immigration 
law, Ryo, Deciding to Cross, supra note 7, at 590. See generally Neil Gunningham, 
Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION (Robert 
Baldwin et. al. eds., 2010) (outlining a range of regulatory strategies, including the attributes 
of “smart” regulation essential for voluntary cooperation). 
74. TYLER, COOPERATE, supra note 58, at 6–7.
75. Scholars who write about the involvement of states in immigration law—sometimes
termed immigration federalism—often fail to differentiate whether traditional, sovereignty-
laden federalism or cooperative federalism is in operation. The distinction is important 
because signals of legitimacy are clearest in situations where states voluntarily cooperate—
where the threat of sanction is insignificant, or where cooperation may be against self-
interest—as opposed to situations where federal preemption may dictate the terms of state 
policymaking such that states do not have a genuine choice. DACA’s operation in the states 
constitutes a case study of state cooperation within a voluntary regime.  
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standards for themselves than is required by law.76 Their explanation for 
this behavior, termed over-compliance, is that the organizations respond 
to a social license, generated by a desire to maintain positive relationships 
within the community and a reputation for doing the right thing (or at 
least to avoid a negative reputation). While the threat of enforcement can 
be present and intertwined with social license, this research shows that 
social motivations for cooperation supplement and sometimes 
overshadow self-interested considerations of cost, efficiency, or public 
accountability and lead to cooperation beyond what legal enforcement 
and institutional authority can compel. Of course, institutions can also 
choose not to cooperate, to cooperate partially, or to cooperate 
involuntarily under promise of sanction or reward. The state cooperation 
continuum models the decision-making process that translates beliefs 
into behaviors and the policy outcomes that result. Although empirical 
studies of legitimacy and compliance typically study attitudes and 
behaviors quantitatively, this Article adapts empirical approaches toward 
studying legitimacy for qualitative, case study analysis.77 
In addition to operationalizing legitimacy for empirical study, this 
Article builds on the concept of legitimacy in another way. It shifts the 
unit of analysis from individual to institutional cooperation with laws, 
using states' decisions to incorporate elements of federal law into their 
own policymaking as evidence of cooperation. Like individuals, 
institutions decide whether or not to cooperate with federal laws based 
partly on their perceptions of the legitimacy of the federal law or their 
belief in the institutional authorities that issued the laws. The cross-
sectional analysis of state motivations for adopting their driver’s license 
policies corresponds to individual motivations. Some of the state 
motivations and justifications for following federal rules are instrumental 
or self-serving ones—for example, obtaining funds from the federal 
government for necessary state programs. Other state motivations are 
driven by normative commitments, both to procedural and substantive 
ideals. A notion of procedural justice entails recognition of the federal 
government’s authority to issue commands or to fairly administer a 
program, notwithstanding independently-held and even contrary 
76. NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND 
ENVIRONMENT 1 (2003). 
77. For more information about the comparative case study method, see generally
Andrew Bennett, Process Tracing and Causal Inference, in RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY 207 
(Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (endorsing case study methods such as 
process tracing and within-case analysis as legitimate means of social scientific explanation 
and advancing or evaluating alternative explanations for policy developments). Comparisons 
between survey and case study analysis of legitimacy in immigration law is further discussed 
at infra notes 91–93. 
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substantive policy preferences. It also entails recognition of the officials’ 
trustworthiness and good faith motives. Substantive policy concerns can 
complement these procedural grounds for accepting a federal policy. 
Public safety is key among them in driver’s license policies. Facilitating 
a sense of community belonging is another, seen in driver’s licenses, 
access to health care, and access to higher education. 
While legitimacy and state cooperation have not typically been 
studied together, combining the two literatures generates important 
insights. Cooperation in the states might include policies that embrace 
elements of federal policy and or even over comply with federal 
requirements—for example, with states promulgating state legislation to 
protect undocumented immigrants in ways that go beyond what the 
federal executive can accomplish. Uncooperative state policymaking sits 
at the other end of the spectrum—within constraints, states may choose 
not to cooperate or not to cooperate fully, with federal laws in the 
enactment of their own state policies. Some states enact contrary 
immigration laws or directly challenge federal laws that conflict with 
their policy preferences. Others reluctantly acquiesce to federal policy, 
express doubt while taking cooperative actions, or only technically 
comply. 
Admittedly, the correspondence between individual decision-
making and institutional decision-making is not perfect. It is not always 
clear who speaks for the state as a public actor when the state’s value 
preferences are internally divided.78 Moreover, elected officials such as 
governors and state legislators face pressure to get re-elected and can use 
public statements strategically to appeal to their constituents, rather than 
straightforwardly explaining their own policy preferences.79 Yet the 
78. Political scientists routinely confront this challenge when examining Congress. See,
e.g., Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron,
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992) (pointing out collective action problems in entities
comprised of multiple actors and conditions of divided government). Legal scholars and
courts encounter reliability problems when using legislative history as a guide to legislative
intent, though the use of legislative history in courts and scholarship is well-established even
if it is contested. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 179, 189 (1986–
87), quoted in ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 137–38 (2012). While these concerns are important, policy narratives and
public statements capture the official justification for policy. They also provide more
information than text alone.
79. Public choice theory posits that public officials are rational actors whose actions are 
guided by their pursuit of re-election. While an important theory of political behavior, the 
critique is not universally accepted and its force is no more present in the study of state 
cooperation than the study of Congressional behavior. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Public 
Choice and Constitutional Design, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 261–78 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).  
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process-tracing analysis used in this Article emulates the methods 
commonly used for policy development and diffusion analysis. The 
analysis also contains confirmatory evidence that mitigates the 
limitations of public statements, such as sworn statements or stipulations 
in litigation and personal correspondence. 
A few more cautionary notes on measuring legitimacy empirically. 
First, the observable beliefs associated with legitimacy derive from an 
internal point of view; they are signals of what ordinary people and public 
officials believe to be valid, rather than external or exogenous judgments 
of what is moral or legitimate.80 Second, the combination of attitudes and 
behaviors referred to as voluntary cooperation relies on the relational 
logic used in comparative case studies. Standing alone, the existence of 
state policies as signals of behavioral acquiescence can only convey a 
weak sense of legitimacy. People have not overtly resisted a law’s claims 
of authority for undetermined reasons that may or may not explain their 
behavior. A stronger sense of legitimacy would rest on evidence of 
attitudes of acceptance apart from self-interest, custom, and other 
motivations. It would also show a link between attitudes and behaviors. 
Case studies of state policymaking reveal inferences that a particular set 
of policymakers believe a federal policy is legitimate. Case studies cannot 
prove a causal connection. Still the methods of comparative case study, 
process tracing, and in-depth policy analysis have advantages over other 
methods for investigating state policymaking: counting and coding state 
policies that incorporate or reject DACA as proof of policymakers’ 
beliefs, reporting on public reception to executive action through public 
opinion polls, or conducting regression or event history analysis.81 
80. Use of the internal viewpoint is cognizant of H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law.
Hart sets out the proposition that problems of normative uncertainty are resolved with rules 
of recognition—rules about rules—that determine which rules are binding. H. L. A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 8–11 (1961); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2006). This distinction is also captured by socio-legal scholars 
such as Roscoe Pound and others who refer to “law on the books” and “law-in-action.” See, 
e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.
55, 57 (1963); David Nelken, Law In Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157, 159, 166 (1984). Ed Rubin commends studying
“signals” of consent to authority as a meaningful way of understanding compliance in modern 
government. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT 148, 160–65 (2005).
81. Bennett, supra note 77 (endorsing case study methods such as process tracing and
within-case analysis as legitimate means of social scientific explanation and advancing or 
evaluating alternative explanations for policy developments). 
2016] Beyond Legality 109 
III. STATE COOPERATION WITH EXECUTIVE ACTION
As federal policy, DACA relies on states for its implementation only 
indirectly. States do not have to implement DACA. Rather, states can 
choose to incorporate the federal lawful presence designation in their own 
policymaking. This Part provides some illustrations, beginning with state 
policies issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants with 
DACA and then moving to state policies conditioning receipt of public 
benefits on lawful presence, specifically access to higher education and 
access to health care insurance. The comparative case studies examine 
two issues: first, why states cooperate with DACA in their establishment 
of local policies and, second, how those decisions translate into state 
policies. Despite the variations across policies, as a whole, the case 
studies show that the states that enact policies supportive of DACA signal 
that they do so because they accept DACA’s legitimacy, either alone or 
in combination with legality and morality. Those that resist DACA doubt 
its legitimacy above all. 
A. Driver’s Licenses for DACA Recipients
While DACA is a federal policy, driver’s licenses are traditionally 
regulated by states. Many states rely on DACA’s lawful presence 
designation when setting driver’s license requirements, even if DACA 
does not compel state cooperation in the way that a federal statute might 
under a regulatory preemption framework. That is because DACA is an 
executive action administered through nonbinding agency guidance.82 In 
the absence of a legally-binding federal mandate, states can elect to 
cooperate or not—presumably on their estimations of the federal policy’s 
legitimacy and also other independently-held values. By comparison, a 
legal framework involving a federal law that mandates state participation 
might compel cooperation out of respect for the rule of law, even if states 
do not believe the federal policy to be legitimate, or by federal 
82. Some scholars contend that DACA could have preemptive effect and note that it is
an unresolved legal issue. Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the 
President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 717 (2014) (arguing that 
executive immigration policies that are subject to accountability, transparency and 
deliberation mechanisms, including DACA, have the same preemptive effect as official 
agency decisions promulgated pursuant to procedural formalities); David S. Rubenstein, 
Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 83–84 
(2013) (noting contradictory claims about whether DACA carries the force of law and should 
have preemptive effect given that it is considered law for separation of powers purposes and 
non-law for the APA). This issue is raised indirectly in Texas v. United States in connection 
with the states’ standing to sue the federal government. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 
3d 591, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 
2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
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preemption of state law. 
Rather than being fully in the state or federal domain, driver’s 
licenses come into a zone of shared governance under the federal REAL 
ID Act of 2005. The REAL ID Act responded to security lapses that 
permitted the September 11th terrorist attackers to obtain valid licenses. 
Faced with pressure to heighten security and fear of an intrusive national 
identity card, the federal government resisted the temptation to create a 
uniform national identity card and instead channeled calls for increased 
security into their passage of a federal statute setting standards for state 
licenses. The standards apply if states opt to issue driver’s licenses to 
immigrants and then seek to use those licenses for federal purposes.83 
Among other requirements, the state-issued license must bear distinctive 
markings so that it is not confused with an ordinary license when being 
used for federal purposes such as accessing federal buildings, 
identification for airline travel, and proof of identity for accessing federal 
benefits. States may choose to provide licenses that fail to meet the 
minimum federal standard with the understanding that such licenses may 
not be acceptable for federal purposes.84 There is some dispute about 
whether this governing scheme constitutes true cooperative federalism, 
in which the federal government permits states an option to govern 
according to its specifications lest the federal government occupy the 
field or impose conditions on acceptance of federal grant money for the 
achievement of federal objectives. Yet the federal-state governance 
scheme retains an element of state voluntariness during the period of 
study, when they were not yet required to comply with REAL ID, making 
it a suitable case study for cooperation.85 
Until DACA was issued in 2012, most states were initially reluctant 
to issue licenses to undocumented immigrants, and many of those who 
83. See REAL ID ACT, 49 U.S.C § 30301 (2012).
84. See TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34430, THE REAL ID ACT OF
2005: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 3 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/RL34430.pdf. 
85. The REAL ID Act example of cooperative federalism is used in Charlton Copeland,
Beyond Separation in Federal Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm 
of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CON. L. 91, 151–53 (2012) (“[T]he national government has 
attempted to leverage its authority in one area—its authority to determine what identification 
is acceptable by federal agencies—to impose obligations on state governments to meet 
nationally-articulated requirements.”); cf. Doris Marie Provine & Monica W. Varsanyi, 
Immigration Federalism in the Shifting Political Sands of Two Neighboring States 7–9 (2015) 
(unpublished paper presented at Law & Society Association Annual Meeting) (on file with 
author) (characterizing REAL ID as an “unfunded mandate” because state driver’s licenses 
would be practically meaningless without federal compliance, notwithstanding the initial 
phase-in period and temporary waiver). 
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did resisted REAL ID Act requirements.86 The release of DHS memos 
clarifying that the federally-issued EAD is sufficient documentation of 
lawful presence for a REAL-ID compliant license led to an increased 
number of states granting to undocumented immigrants driver’s 
licenses.87 As of August 2015, the national landscape evinces a trend 
toward states’ issuing driver’s licenses that incorporate DACA’s lawful 
presence designation. Depending on how you count, forty-eight states 
voluntarily recognize DACA’s legitimacy in their driver’s license 
policies and litigation lifted the remaining bans so that all fifty states now 
offer them.88 The virtual consensus among states granting licenses to 
DACA recipients after 2012—in addition to the timing of those state 
policies—speaks to the states’ broad acceptance of DACA as a legitimate 
source of lawful presence and valid evidence of work eligibility. 
86. States lagged in their compliance with REAL ID conditions for noncitizen driver’s
licenses to such a great extent that the DHS has repeatedly delayed their implementation and 
enforcement efforts. For a review of state implementation of the REAL ID Act, see 
Countdown to REAL ID, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
transportation/count-down-to-real-id.aspx (last updated Oct. 29, 2014); Priscilla M. Regan & 
Christopher J. Deering, State Opposition to REAL ID, 39 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 476, 481 
(2009) (twenty-one states enacted legislation opposing REAL ID in 2007, same year that the 
rule released); JIM HARPER, CATO INST., REAL ID: A STATE-BY-STATE UPDATE 2 (2014), 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa749_web_1.pdf (REAL ID is 
“moribund”). 
87. The DHS reports that forty-one states are compliant in 2013. Press Release, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., DHS Releases Phased Enforcement Schedule for REAL ID (Dec. 20, 
2013), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/12/20/dhs-releases-phased-enforcement-schedule-
real-id.  
88. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Federal Policy and Examples of State
Actions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
immigration/deferred-action.aspx; Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 13, at 43–44 
(using statistical analysis to show that DACA rather than political factors such as Democratic 
control over state government and growing Latino populations “catalyzed” issuance of 
licenses to undocumented immigrants). The categorization of state policies depends on the 
specific elements of state law being tracked and measured. A National Immigration Law 
Center (NILC) report breaks out states granting licenses to DACA beneficiaries into 
categories: states where officials have confirmed that DACA beneficiaries are eligible for 
licenses through statements or simply through granting licenses; state laws explicitly 
including DACA or deferred action documents as proof of lawful presence to obtain a license; 
states mentioning the EAD in a law or document list; I-797 communication regarding 
immigration benefits. Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGR.
L. CTR. (June 19, 2013), http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html. Scholars Pratheepan
Gulasekaram and Karthick Ramakrishnan point out that forty-six states have affirmatively
stated that they would provide DACA recipients with driver’s licenses, however, only two
states actively withheld driver’s licenses from DACA recipients. See Gulasekaram &
Ramakrishnan, supra note 13. Other reports focus on states extending driver’s licenses to all
undocumented immigrants. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., DECIDING WHO DRIVES: STATE
CHOICES SURROUNDING UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND DRIVER’S LICENSES (2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2015/08/Deciding-Who-Drives.pdf.
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What the nearly unanimous uniform count of state policies obscures 
is the variety of attitudes and justifications for going along with DACA. 
To illustrate the complex and dynamic thought process behind state 
cooperation, this Article engages in qualitative analysis of a critical 
sample of states where attitudes toward licenses was clearly influenced, 
if not altered, by DACA.89 The states include a range of immigrant 
population sizes, proximity to border, inclusive immigration policies, and 
political climates—all factors shown to matter in statistical studies of 
state immigration policy.90 In most situations, the states were initially 
unclear or opposed to issuing licenses to immigrants and gradually 
changed their policies or practices in recognition of DACA. Evidence of 
these shifting attitudes and DACA’s influence can be found in legislative 
histories, executive memoranda, public statements, and other informal 
communications about state policy; the states that engaged in litigation 
left behind a useful paper trail of their views and positions. Evidence of 
shifting behaviors can be found through a process of tracing documents 
showing cooperative state policymaking. 
1. Attitudes Toward DACA and Rationales for Cooperation
State policymakers’ rationales for adopting state policies supportive
of DACA help explain their willingness to cooperate with nonbinding 
federal policy. Three decision-making factors identified in other 
sociological studies of legitimacy include legality, legitimacy, and 
morality. Legality is an instrumental concern encompassed by 
calculations of legal incentives and the threat of sanction for 
noncompliance.91 Legitimacy is a normative view of institutional 
authority often premised on procedural justice—for example, belief in the 
89. The sampled states exclude those who adopted driver’s licenses prior to DACA or
pursuant to state decision-making that is independent of the 2012 federal policy. Thanks to 
David Martin and Hiroshi Motomura for making the distinction. 
90. For more on the factors associated with state immigration policies, see S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances 
Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY
ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 73, 74–76 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010); Graeme 
Boushey & Adam Luedtke, Immigrants Across The U.S. Federal Laboratory: Explaining 
State Level Innovation in Immigration Policy, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 390, 392 (2011); 
PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION
FEDERALISM 87 (2015); Monica Varsanyi & Doris Marie Provine, Divergent States: 
Explaining Immigration Policy Trajectories in New Mexico and Arizona 19–25 (2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also infra notes 254 and 259.  
91. In legitimacy studies involving survey data, the question most closely associated
with legality is whether respondent agrees with the statement: “In general, people should obey 
the law, even if it goes against what they think is right.” See, e.g., Ryo, Deciding to Cross, 
supra note 7, at 582–83; Ryo, Less Enforcement, supra note 7, at 638. 
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trustworthiness of federal executives or the fairness of their policy 
administration.92 Morality, or substantive policy preferences, constitute 
another type of normative evaluation focused on whether states’ 
substantive policy preferences align with or deviate from federal policy.93 
States can and do offer multiple reasons for enacting cooperative policies, 
but this brief summary disaggregates the three main reasons. 
Figure 1: State Policymakers’ Attitudes toward DACA 
and Rationales for Cooperation 
Legality and Legal Threat • Presence of binding state
legislation
• Presence of state litigation
(“legal threat”)
Legitimacy (Procedural Justice or 
Respect for Institutional Authority) 
• Respect for executive authority
to issue DACA (PD, USCIS
guidance, non-legislation)
• Respect for immigration
enforcement authority (fed
problem, ICE)
Morality and Substantive Policy 
Preferences 
• Pro/anti-immigration climate
(e.g. pro-DREAMer attitudes)
• Public safety, cost, and other
pragmatic considerations
92. The relevant institutional authority here would be President Obama and the DHS
agency (USCIS) that administers DACA. 
93. This cluster of motivations refers to substantive policy preferences or normative
commitments around immigration enforcement and can be distinguished from exogenous 
senses of morality. A survey methodology might ask whether the respondent thinks crossing 
the border without authorization is moral or whether children should be held responsible for 
unlawfully crossing the border with their parents. Multiple studies score state climate toward 
immigrants based on external assessments of state policies toward immigrants. See, e.g., 
MICHAEL A. RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., CREATING CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HEALTHY PEOPLE: STATE
POLICIES THAT AFFECT THE HEALTH OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 1, 
12–13 tbl. (2015), http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/publications/Documents/PDF/2015/ 
immigrantreport-apr2015.pdf (immigrant integration scores shown in Table: scoring of 
policies related to undocumented immigrants’ health, total and policy area scores); Huyen 
Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants: A State-by-State Analysis, 
in STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 21, 32 tbl.1.2 (Carissa 
Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014) (immigrant climate index). 
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A. Legality and Legal Threat
Once again, legality is an instrumental concern encompassed by
calculations of legal incentives and the threat of sanction for 
noncompliance. A state’s concern for legality can be seen in the presence 
of binding state legislation or litigation. 
In general, states respecting the rule of law will feel constrained by 
existing state laws as they enact policies cognizant of federal policy. A 
state that enacts its own driver’s license legislation benefitting DACA 
recipients is supportive of the federal policy, if not overly compliant with 
it. California, for example, a state known for its activism on DREAMer 
legislation in other policy arenas, incorporated DACA’s lawful presence 
requirements into its repeal of a restrictive driver’s license law in 201394 
and also expressly included DACA recipients in its vehicle code.95 The 
legislative history of the bill urges the President to go beyond DACA in 
suspension of non-criminal immigrant deportations.96 Also, California 
Governor Jerry Brown made pro-DREAMer statements when signing the 
bill.97 
In contrast to the supporting role that California’s pro-immigrant 
state law played by incorporating DACA into its policies, Texas’s and 
Florida’s pro-immigrant state laws exposed friction in support for DACA. 
Both states’ laws permit DACA recipients to receive driver’s licenses.98 
94. See Act of Oct. 3, 2013, ch. 524, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4306, 4306, 4307 (West) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the California Vehicle Code) (explaining that California’s 
law at the time of the bill’s enactment denied undocumented immigrants access to licenses, 
requiring the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue licenses to individuals unable to submit 
proof of authorized presence under federal law if they meet certain residency requirements, 
and stating that the law went into effect January 1, 2015). 
95. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 571, sec. 3, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4654, 4655, (codified as
amended at CAL. VEH. CODE § 13001 (West Supp. 2015)) (amending state vehicle code by 
adding section relating to childhood arrivals); CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.6 (West Supp. 2015) 
(“Any federal document demonstrating favorable action by the federal government for 
acceptance of a person into the deferred action for childhood arrivals program shall satisfy 
the requirements of [California law].”). 
96. See Hearing Relative to Immigration on S.R. 40 Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3, 4 (Cal. 2013) (introduced by Sen. Lou Correa), http:// 
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SR40# (follow 
“05/05/14- Senate Judiciary” hyperlink). 
97. Gov. Jerry Brown signed a law permitting DACA licenses in October 2013. Patrick
McGreevy, DMV Prepares to Issue Driver’s Licenses to Those People Who Are Here 
Illegally, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-
immigrant-licenses-20141211-story.html.  
98. Texas law simply provides that “[a]n applicant who is not a citizen of the United
States must present to the department documentation issued by the appropriate United States 
agency that authorizes the applicant to be in the United States before the applicant may be 
issued a driver’s license.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.142(a) (West 2013 & Supp. 2014). 
In October 2012, the Texas Department of Public Safety amended their administrative 
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However, both states’ governors vetoed some form of the legislation and 
expressed disapproval of DACA while acknowledging the need to follow 
state authority.99 The position, labeled “compliance dubitante,” is 
exemplified by Texas Governor Perry’s statement (after acknowledging 
Texas’s state law provides licenses): “In Texas, our legislature passed 
laws that . . . are right for Texas.”100 He makes it clear that his state’s 
policy was a product of its sovereign authority and not deference to the 
federal government.101 The clarification is important, if not prescient, as 
Texas became the lead plaintiff in the Texas v. United States lawsuit 
challenging the federal government’s authority to enact DAPA and 
expand DACA.102 
Apart from binding legislation, states may be motivated by the 
presence or threat of litigation. While states may fear litigation even when 
the threat is somewhat speculative, direct entanglement with the courts 
heightens this anxiety and strengthens the states’ instrumental 
motivations for cooperating with federal policy. In North Carolina, the 
Department of Transportation's Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 
first issued, then suspended, and then reinstated thirteen licenses to 
DACA recipients while seeking clarification of legal requirements.103 
Specifically, officials within the North Carolina DMV questioned 
whether the issued licenses conformed with North Carolina law after 
DACA, and they made the decision to suspend the licenses pending their 
regulation listing documents acceptable for proof of eligibility to include those with lawful 
presence and began issuing licenses to qualifying immigrants. See Helene N. Dang, Texas 
DPS Implements New Verification Process for Driver’s Licenses, TEX. IMMIGR. LAW BLOG 
(Oct. 25, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://sinelson.typepad.com/susan-i-nelson-immigrat/2012/10/ 
texas-dps-implements-new-verification-process-for-drivers-licenses-.html; H.B. 235, 2013 
Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
99. Governor Scott vetoed the Florida bill H.B. 235 in June 2013. See Veto Message
from Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., to Kenneth W. Detzner, Sec’y of State of Fla., on H.B.235, 
http://www.flgov.com/2013/06/04/governor-rick-scott-vetoes-hb-235/. In Texas, Governor 
Perry vetoed H.B. 396. See H.B. 396, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), http://www. 
legis.state.tx.us/billlookup/History.aspx?LegSess=77R&Bill=HB396; see also Proclamation 
of Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., Vetoing H.B. 396 (Jun. 17, 2001), http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/ 
scanned/vetoes/77/hb396.pdf#navpanes=0. 
100. Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Greg Abbott, Tex. Att’y Gen. (Aug.
16, 2012), http://s3.amazonaws.com/static.texastribune.org/media/documents/O-AbbottGreg 
20120817_1.pdf. 
101. Id.
102. See infra Part IV.
103. See Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Transp., NCDOT to Issue Driver Licenses for
Those Who Qualify under DACA (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.ncdot.gov/download/dmv/ 
DACA/PressReleaseDACA.pdf (reinstating driving privileges to thirteen qualified 
individuals whose licenses were suspended pending N.C. Attorney General’s opinion). 
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request for an official opinion from the state’s Attorney General.104 In a 
2014 response letter to the Acting Commissioner for the Division of 
Motor Vehicles, Chief Deputy Attorney General Grayson Kelley 
confirmed that the DMV should issue driver’s licenses to immigrants that 
have documentary proof that they received DACA’s lawful presence 
designation pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 20-
7(s).105 According to the response letter, although DACA recipients do 
not receive lawful immigration status, they are entitled to driver’s 
licenses because they are lawfully present for a certain period of time.106 
The response letter adopts the reasoning expressed in President Obama’s 
executive action and Janet Napolitano’s subsequent DHS guidance to 
reach this conclusion.107 It states: 
Based on our review of the historical background and legal concepts 
applicable to prosecutorial discretion and deferred status in the 
enforcement of immigration laws, we believe that individuals who 
present documentation demonstrating a grant of deferred action by the 
United States government are legally present in the United States and 
entitled to a drivers [sic] license of limited duration.108 
While the Attorney General’s letter stops short of instigating litigation, it 
contemplates the possibility of litigation by seeking an authoritative legal 
interpretation in advance of making its own policies. 
The threat of litigation is realized in Arizona and Nebraska, the two 
states most reluctant to cooperate with DACA in the enactment of their 
state driver’s license policies. Arizona waged a long war on the legality 
of DACA beginning with Governor Jan Brewer’s executive order barring 
DACA recipients from receiving driver’s licenses despite permitting 
others with deferred action to receive them.109 The state executive order, 
which was subsequently codified by the state legislature, was stayed by 
the Ninth Circuit and then eventually struck down by the federal district 
104. See Letter from Michael Robertson, Comm’r, N.C. Dep’t of Transp., Dep’t of
Motor Vehicles, to Roy Cooper, N.C. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 10, 2012) (requesting written 
opinion clarifying legal requirements). 
105. Letter from Grayson G. Kelley, N.C. Chief Deputy Att’y Gen., to Eric Boyette,
Acting Comm’r, N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles 1–2 (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncdoj.gov/ 
News-and-Alerts/News-Releases-and-Advisories/Related-Information/Boyette,-Eric-1-17-
2013.aspx (referencing 2012 DMV request letter and explaining that the state should offer 
driver’s licenses to undocumented, DACA-eligible immigrants based on Janet Napolitano’s 
DACA guidance memo).  
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Ariz. Exec. Order. No. 2012-6, 18 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 2237 (2012).
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court.110 Arizona's lackluster implementation thereafter demonstrates that 
the state reluctantly conceded in litigation. In Nebraska, litigation 
threatened a similar law denying driver’s licenses to DACA recipients 
until the Nebraska state legislature passed a new law that mooted the 
lawsuit.111 
B. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a normative view of institutional authority premised
on fairness or trust. It shows itself in the narratives of state policymaking 
as respect for executive authority to issue DACA and respect for 
immigration enforcement authority. 
States cooperate with DACA if they believe the federal policy issues 
from legitimate and trustworthy authority, whether that authority is the 
President’s immigration enforcement discretion or the USCIS’s use of 
guidance to exercise it. This belief in a federal policy’s 
“respectworthiness” takes on a procedural cast. Since a validly-elected 
president or a validly-appointed agency head enacted this federal policy, 
I will support it due to my sense of obligation to voluntarily obey and 
notwithstanding my substantive policy preferences.112 In Nevada, one of 
the states whose views on immigration are internally divided, belief in 
DACA was clearly influential in its adoption of an inclusionary driver’s 
license policy. Prior to DACA, Nevada regulations established by the 
DMV required proof of legal presence with two documents, an 
identification card, and proof of a Social Security number.113 Once 
President Obama announced the DACA program in 2012, the DMV and 
Governor Brian Sandoval rearticulated that the state would accept the 
EAD provided to DACA recipients as proof of lawful presence for the 
110. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II), 757 F.3d 1053, 1068
(9th Cir. 2014), remanded to 81 F. Supp. 3d 795 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
111. Hernandez v. Heineman, No. CI 13-2124, slip op. at 1 (Neb. Dist. Ct. June 11,
2015) (voluntarily dismissed). The new Nevada law overrode a Governor’s veto to alter the 
original prohibition and mooted the litigation. L.B. 623, 140th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2015). 
112. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002) (breaks out “motive
based trust” from procedural justice). 
113. Nevada Revised Statutes section 483.290(3) (2014) requires the Department of
Motor Vehicles to adopt regulations providing for the issuance and other details of driver’s 
licenses. The Department of Motor Vehicles required two documents to prove identification 
(other license, passport, or birth certificate or certificate of naturalization or green card) and 
one document to prove Social Security number (pay stub with Social Security number, tax 
return, W-2, Social Security card). See Proof of Identity & Address, NEV. DEP’T MOTOR
VEHICLES http://www.dmvnv.com/dlresidency.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2015) (explaining the 
documents required for each of a REAL ID compliant license, a standard driver’s license 
(substantially the same) and a driver authorization card). 
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purpose of obtaining a state-issued driver’s license.114 Although DACA 
recipients would have been eligible for driver’s licenses already (the EAD 
is listed as an acceptable document to establish proof of identity), Nevada 
officials nevertheless took DACA as an opportunity to clarify their 
position publicly. Nevada’s senate leadership announced their party’s 
support for Obama’s executive action in November 2012; Republican and 
Democratic state senators cited the positive benefits that DACA would 
have on the state’s education system and economy and public safety for 
drivers in declaring their support for the program.115 In light of the 
bipartisan support,116 the state passed a new law extending the driver’s 
license benefit to all undocumented immigrants—going beyond DACA 
recipients—within six months.117 Revealing sensitivity to the plight of 
undocumented immigrants, the Nevada bill “requires that a driver 
authorization card and an instruction permit obtained in accordance with 
[this law] be of the same design as a driver’s license with only the 
minimum number of changes necessary to comply with the federal Real 
ID Act of 2005,”118 to balance the goals of cooperating with the federal 
government and protecting immigrants who bear the distinguishing cards 
by letting them “feel safe enough with the application process.”119 The 
belief in DACA’s legitimacy manifests itself substantively in the 
adoption of state law that over-complies with federal policy and also in 
the large number of licenses subsequently issued. 
114. State Senate GOP Leadership Endorses Drivers’ Licenses For Deferred Action
Program, NEV. NEWS BUREAU (Nov. 30, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www. 
nevadanewsbureau.com/2012/11/30/state-senate-gop-leadership-endorses-drivers-licenses-
for-deferred-action-program/. 
115. Id.
116. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of twenty to one, and the General Assembly
passed it by thirty to nine. S.B. 303 Votes, NEV. ELEC. LEGIS. INFO. SYS., 
https://nelis.leg.state.nv.us/77th2013/App#/77th2013/Bill/Votes/SB303 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2015). 
117. Senate Bill 303 was introduced March 18, 2013, and signed into law May 31,
2013. S.B. 303 Overview, NEV. ELEC. LEGISLATIVE INFO. SYS., https://nelis.leg.state.nv.us/ 
77th2013/App#/77th2013/Bill/Overview/SB303 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015); see also S.B. 
303, 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 481.850 (2014)). 
Interestingly, just six months prior, the Nevada Supreme Court denied a driver’s license to 
man who claimed that he was entitled to one and brought suit under state law. See Ed Vogel, 
Nevada Justices Reject Immigrant’s Driver’s License Request, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (June 18, 
2013, 3:43 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/nevada-justices-reject-
immigrants-drivers-license-request. The Nevada Supreme Court denied the undocumented 
immigrant’s writ without explanation. Schoka v. Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 58537, 
2013 WL 3227732 (Nev. June 14, 2013). 
118. Nev. S.B. 303 (emphasis added).
119. Meeting of the Assembly Transportation Committee Regarding S.B. 303, 77th Reg. 
Sess. (Nev. 2013) (testimony of Senator Mo Denis, D-2d Dist.). 
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The absence of respect for federal executive authority in Florida 
presents a clear contrast to Nevada’s thought process. Florida’s governor 
made public statements explaining his decision to veto legislation that 
would make DACA recipients expressly eligible for driver’s licenses in 
terms of his lack of respect for executive action.120 Governor Scott 
admonished that his state would continue to grant driver’s licenses to 
DACA recipients, but that he was making a symbolic statement against 
the practice by vetoing the bill.121 To him, the President’s policy was 
adopted “without legal basis”—it was not “passed by Congress, nor . . . 
a promulgated rule”—and so the legislature should not have done it “by 
relying on . . . federal government policy.”122 He would instead permit 
the practice only as a matter of the original state law, without 
incorporating President Obama’s nonbinding federal policy. Similar 
statements could be made about Arizona, whose persistent doubts about 
DACA’s legitimacy resulted in lackluster compliance and contributed to 
the low number of licenses sought out by immigrants notwithstanding a 
judicial opinion clarifying and mandating Arizona’s cooperation as a 
matter of legal compliance.123 
Underlying states’ respect for executive authority to issue DACA is 
a more general concern for the federal government’s credibility on 
immigration enforcement. Perhaps the only unifying issue among states 
enacting inclusionary or exclusionary driver’s license policies is their 
dissatisfaction with the federal government’s handling of immigration 
enforcement. California believes that DACA is an inadequate fix to the 
broken immigration system—preferring a comprehensive immigration 
reform bill with a DREAM Act that would provide relief from 
deportation and a pathway to legalization through legislation—and seeks 
to go farther than the Obama Administration is willing to through the 
provision of a state safety net extending driver’s licenses among other 
benefits. Texas and Nebraska, until recently, believed that the federal 
government was exacerbating the problem of under-enforcement that had 
produced the large undocumented population DACA seeks to redress. As 
an example, Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman announced a broad 
policy of excluding DACA recipients from licenses, welfare, and public 
benefits. Governor Heineman claimed that Nebraska is a “welcoming 
120. See Press Release, Rick Scott, Gov. of Tex., Governor Rick Scott Vetoes HB 235
(June 4, 2013), http://www.flgov.com/2013/06/04/governor-rick-scott-vetoes-hb-235/. 
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Arizona’s driver’s license policies and the resulting litigation are described as
“involuntary cooperation” and further described in the next section on cooperative behaviors, 
infra notes 160–167. 
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state” and that “we’re glad to have [DACA immigrants] in our state, but 
do it legally.”124 “When you don’t secure the border, have a speedier, 
technological way to legal immigration and you won’t address the issue 
that we have 15 million illegal immigrants in the country right now, we 
end up with these situations,” Heineman said.125 Texas hinted at the same 
problem when it described the cost burden that it bears to absorb large 
numbers of undocumented immigrants inside its borders as the result of 
a federal policy it does not support.126 In a middle ground, Illinois’ 
Kankakee County sheriff stated that, “the issues of illegal immigration 
and obtaining a driver’s license need to be considered separately. The 
safety of the driving public should be the issue.”127 
C. Morality: Policy, Politics, Partisanship
A state’s sense of morality shows in its values and substantive policy
preferences. This style of normative evaluation focuses on whether states’ 
substantive policies align with federal immigration policy. It also entails 
the states’ values with regard to other policy goals. 
Morality refers to substantive policy preferences such as the states’ 
stance on federal immigration policy generally and DACA 
specifically.128 Put simply, if in somewhat reductionist terms, a pro-
immigrant stance would be favorable toward DACA and discretionary 
immigration enforcement whereas an anti-immigrant stance would be 
more skeptical of DACA and selective immigration enforcement. Politics 
and partisanship refers to the official or unofficial positions adopted by 
elected representatives from the two-major political parties. Also put 
124. Brent Martin, Nebraska to Defy Obama Administration Deferred Action Program,
NEB. RADIO NETWORK (Aug. 20, 2012), http://nebraskaradionetwork.com/2012/08/20/ 
nebraska-to-defy-obama-administration-deferred-action-program-audio/. His successor, 
Governor Ricketts, vetoed a state law for DACA licenses “on principle” before being 
overridden by the state legislature in May 2015. See Act of May 28, 2015, 2015 Neb. Laws 
L.B. 623.
125. Martin, supra note 124.
126. See Driver’s Licenses for All Immigrants: Quotes from Law Enforcement, NAT’L 
IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Oct. 2004), http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/DL_law_enfrcmnt_ 
quotes_101404.pdf [hereinafter NILC Quotes] (quoting thirteen law enforcement officers 
from a variety of states supporting universal licensing). This is essentially the same argument 
that Texas advances as proof of injury in the Texas v. United States lawsuit against DAPA 
and the DACA expansion in November 2014. No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
127. NILC Quotes, supra note 126.
128. This Article reports on signals of states’ subjective beliefs that DACA is moral in
the sense of substantively and normatively desirable. It does not make the argument that 
DACA is moral in an objective sense or suggest that a state’s belief in its morality makes it 
so. On morality in the latter sense, I defer to specialists in jurisprudence engaged in a deeper 
and enduring conversation on morality that goes beyond the scope of this Article. 
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simply for immediate purposes, Republicans would be challengers to the 
closely related DAPA program by virtue of their participation in the 
Texas v. United States litigation and bills to roll back immigration-related 
executive action; Democrats would be deemed as supporters.129 Morality 
is distinguished from strategic politics and partisanship in this discussion. 
One competing explanation for state acquiescence is that states use 
driver’s license policies to express their predispositions toward 
undocumented immigrants rather than anything particular to the DACA 
program or the use of executive action. This explanation could be offered 
for California’s statements of support given that they emphasize pro-
immigrant feelings and recognize driver’s licenses in connection to a 
range of benefits that go beyond licensing. It also explains Nebraska’s 
statement of opposition to driver’s licenses, in which Nebraska Governor 
Heineman groups together the “continu[ing] . . . practice of not issuing 
driver’s licenses, welfare benefits or other public benefits to illegal 
immigrants.”130 While predispositions cannot be discounted, they are not 
a persuasive explanation ultimately because nearly every state provides 
licenses, regardless of the wide variation in immigrant climate indexes, 
immigrant integration scores, and partisanship. 
Apart from policy preferences for immigration enforcement, a state 
could instead adopt their policies on the basis of independent policy 
goals. Some policy goals might be a concern for the specific DACA 
population’s tenuous situation as long-time residents vulnerable to 
removal or for public safety concerns. Nevada, a moderate state with 
mixed support for immigrants generally, provides a solid example in its 
supportive statements that DACA youth are working hard and trying to 
“improve their and the lives of their families.”131 Other policy goals 
might pertain more to the general population, including pragmatic goals 
such as driver safety, insurance, and economic benefits produced by 
facilitating immigrant workers. A number of moderate and even 
conservative states adopt these policy rationales for supporting driver’s 
licenses. For example, Texas Governor Perry deferred to the state 
legislature’s “policy choices,”132 such as the Texas legislature’s concern 
129. For more discussion of the legal and political discourse surrounding DAPA, see
Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Litigation Over 
Administrative Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 64 (2015) 
(distinguishing legal and policy discourse). See also Part IV.B.  
130. Martin, supra note 124. The Nebraska state legislature subsequently adopted a
pro-immigrant driver’s license policy in May 2015. Act of May 28, 2015, 2015 Neb. Laws 
L.B. 623.
131. NEV. NEWS BUREAU, supra note 114.
132. Letter from Rick Perry to Greg Abbott, supra note 100.
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for public safety at the time it adopted its policy.133 Austin’s Assistant 
Chief of Police expressed a similar view on driver safety: 
[W]e strongly believe it would be in the public interest to make
available to these communities the ability to obtain a drivers license. In
allowing this community the opportunity to obtain drivers licenses, they
will have to study our laws and pass a driver’s test that will make them
not only informed drivers but safe drivers.134
Another version of the public safety rationale comes from Kansas, where 
the Kansas City Chief of Police credits driver’s licenses with enhancing 
security by promoting positive identification: “Expanding opportunities 
to obtain drivers’ licenses is not incongruent with homeland security 
considerations; on the contrary, allowing law enforcement to positively 
identify individuals within our state will help law enforcement to identify 
potential threats and reduce vulnerability and raise the feeling of security 
of citizens and non-citizens alike.”135 Cost considerations are another 
reason to license undocumented immigrant drivers.136 Park City, Utah’s 
Chief of Police wagered that the ability to obtain driver’s insurance with 
a license would reduce cost burdens: “having drivers able to purchase 
insurance is a benefit which cannot be overstated. The number of cases 
involving uninsured, unlicensed drivers without current registration 
place[s] an enormous burden on our court system.”137 
133. H.B. 396, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
134. NILC Quotes, supra note 126.
135. Id. This statement preceded DACA and may partially reflect the post-9/11 concern 
for national security through identification that similarly influenced passage of the REAL ID 
Act requirements. 
136. Indeed, the plethora of pragmatic benefits and low costs associated with driver’s
licenses might be one reason for the overwhelming support for driver’s licenses, as opposed 
to more division in other state policies such as higher education and health care. See Part III.B 
and Part III.C. 
137. NILC Quotes, supra note 126. In Texas v. United States, Texas cites to the
preemptive effect of DAPA on states’ driver’s license policies as evidence that states will 
suffer concrete injury and will unfairly bear the cost of issuing additional licenses at a deficit 
if DAPA is implemented. No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015). Although 
Texas’s claim conflates the cost of licenses issued in association with the 2012 DACA 
program with the speculative costs of licenses associated with the not-yet-implemented 
DAPA program, their sharply contrasting cost arguments are worth noting as an expression 
of Texas’s shifting rationale for opposing the extension of state driver’s licenses—arguments 
that play an important role in the litigation over DAPA. More discussion of the litigation is in 
Part IV.A. 
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2. Cooperative Behaviors
How a state translates its attitudes toward a nonbinding federal
policy into cooperative policymaking behaviors also requires close 
examination. The case studies posit that acceptance of a law’s legitimacy 
falls along a spectrum of cooperative behavior and that changing attitudes 
influence changing levels of cooperation. They find that states engage in 
a dynamic process of decision-making as they formulate policies on 
driver’s licenses and craft eligibility criteria that include or exclude 
DACA recipients—based on changing understandings of DACA’s 
legality, legitimacy, and policy desirability among other factors. Figure 2 
shows that states have been generally willing to accept DACA’s 
legitimacy and to acquiesce to its lawful presence designation as valid 
documentation for driver’s licenses; it also shows that there is a spectrum 
of cooperative behavior. For each of the fifty states that could be plotted 
on the spectrum, four types of behaviors are noted in this discussion: 
voluntary cooperation, acquiescence, compliance dubitante, and 
involuntary cooperation. An exemplar of each type is narrated below.138 
Figure 2: Spectrum of Cooperative Behaviors 
 Involuntary  Compliance  Acquiescence  Voluntary 
Cooperation  Dubitante  Cooperation
(AZ)          (TX, FL)                 (NC, IA)          (CA, NV) 
A. Voluntary Cooperation
Together with California,139 Nevada strongly supported DACA with
its driver’s license policies. Prior to DACA, Nevada regulations 
established by the DMV required proof of legal presence with two 
documents, an identification card, and proof of a Social Security 
138. The measures of this cooperation “spectrum” differ across studies surveying
immigration policies in fifty states. See, e.g., RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., supra note 93; Pham & Van, 
supra note 93. 
139. California is a pioneer in pro-immigrant policies such as the issuance of driver’s
licenses to undocumented immigrants and often over-complies with federal requirements 
regarding DACA recipients. See generally S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The 
California Package: Immigrant Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, 6 
POL’Y MATTERS, Spring 2015, at 1, 3.  
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number.140 Once DACA was announced, the Nevada DMV and Governor 
Brian Sandoval announced that the state would accept the EAD provided 
to DACA recipients as proof of lawful presence for the purpose of 
obtaining a state-issued driver’s license.141 Although DACA recipients 
would have been eligible for driver’s licenses already because the state 
listed the EAD as an acceptable document to establish proof of identity 
(no legality concern), state officials nevertheless articulated support for 
extending driver’s licenses to DACA recipients based on their perception 
of DACA’s legitimacy.142 In keeping with their strong support, the state 
passed a new law extending the driver’s license benefit to all 
undocumented immigrants within two months of the bill’s 
introduction.143 This heightened both legality and legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the bill requires that the license “be of the same design as a 
driver’s license with only the minimum number of changes necessary to 
comply with the federal Real ID Act of 2005” to “ensure that people feel 
safe enough with the application process to apply for a driver’s privilege 
card.”144 The enactment of additional safeguards and state law 
demonstrate robust cooperation that results from an alignment of legality 
and legitimacy over moderate policy preferences. 
B. Gradual Acceptance and Acquiescence
Iowa moved gradually toward acceptance of DACA on the basis of
legal clarifications that influences its perceptions of legitimacy and 
legality. Prior to DACA, Iowa’s state law required a Social Security 
number or proof of lawful presence for the issuance of a driver’s 
license.145 Iowa residents challenged Iowa’s law under the Equal 
Protection Clause.146 They argued that state law unfairly authorized the 
Iowa Department of Transportation to waive this requirement for legal 
temporary residents (e.g., foreign students), but not undocumented 
immigrants or others falling short of lawful status.147 The Iowa Supreme 
Court upheld the state law as rationally related to state interests of 
reserving services to those with legal status and discouraging illegal 
140. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
141. NEV. NEWS BUREAU, supra note 114.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
144. S.B. 303, 77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. § 481.850
(2014)); see supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
145. IOWA CODE § 321.196(1) (2014).
146. Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 815, 817 (Iowa 2005) (citing IOWA CODE §
321.182(1)(a)). 
147. Id. at 818–19.
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immigration among other things.148 This raised the threat of legality, 
demonstrating policy preferences contrary to DACA. In December 2012, 
the Iowa Department of Transportation decided not to issue driver’s 
licenses to DACA recipients because the DACA guidance explicitly 
stated that DACA conferred no legal status.149 However, the Iowa 
Department of Transportation subsequently revised its policy in response 
to USCIS’ clarification that DACA furnishes lawful presence, even if not 
lawful status.150  This lessened legality and legitimacy concerns. Iowa 
based its policy on a gradual recognition of DACA’s legality and 
legitimacy over its shifting substantive policy preferences, and yet it 
exhibits cooperative behavior nonetheless. 
North Carolina similarly moved toward acceptance in incremental, 
sometimes halting, steps. In the absence of relevant state law, the North 
Carolina DMV issued and then suspended thirteen licenses to DACA 
recipients while questioning whether DACA conformed to North 
Carolina law.151 In response to the DMV’s request for an official opinion, 
the state Attorney General’s Office confirmed that the DMV should issue 
driver’s licenses to those with documentary proof of DACA lawful 
presence using the reasoning expressed in President Obama’s executive 
order and DHS guidance, and the DMV reinstated the licenses.152 
C. Compliance Dubitante
The widespread acceptance of DACA’s legitimacy in states is
neither unanimous nor uncontested. Texas, for example, provides 
licenses to DACA recipients, but it does so with skepticism of the federal 
executive’s legitimate authority (compliance dubitante) and instead relies 
on its state sovereign authority to make law. Both prior to DACA and 
currently, Texas law simply provides that “an applicant who is not a 
citizen of the United States must present to the department documentation 
148. Id. at 819.
149. See Iowa DOT Will Not Issue Driver’s Licenses or Nonoperator IDs to Persons
Granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Status, IOWA DEP’T TRANSP. (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.news.iowadot.gov/newsandinfo/2012/12/iowa-dot-will-not-issue-drivers-
licenses-or-nonoperator-ids-to-persons-granted-deferred-action-for-c.html. 
150. Iowa Reverses Itself on Driver’s Licenses for DACA Recipients, NEW AMERICA
MEDIA (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://newamericamedia.org/2013/01/iowa-reverses-
itself-on-drivers-licenses-for-daca-recipients.php. 
151. See Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Transp., NCDOT to Issue Driver Licenses for
Those Who Qualify under DACA (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.ncdot.gov/download/dmv/ 
DACA/PressReleaseDACA.pdf (reinstating driving privileges to thirteen qualified 
individuals whose licenses were suspended pending the North Carolina Attorney General’s 
opinion). 
152. See Letter from Grayson G. Kelley to Eric Boyette, supra note 105; supra notes
105–08. 
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issued by the appropriate United States agency that authorizes the 
applicant to be in the United States before the applicant may be issued a 
driver’s license.”153 In 2001, Texas’s legislature attempted to pass a 
statute providing licenses to all undocumented immigrants, but Governor 
Perry vetoed it.154 In October 2012, the Texas Department of Public 
Safety amended their administrative regulation listing documents 
acceptable for proof of eligibility to include those with lawful presence 
and began issuing licenses to qualifying immigrants, citing the need to 
ensure public safety through verification of driving ability and insurance 
coverage.155 It made no reference to DACA, but around the time of the 
administrative change, Governor Perry made a public statement that 
DACA is a “slap in the face to the rule of law.”156 Governor Perry 
expressed his reservations about DACA in a letter stating: “I am writing 
to ensure that all Texas agencies understand that Secretary Napolitano’s 
guidelines . . . do not change our obligations under federal and Texas law 
to determine a person’s eligibility for state and local public benefits.”157 
Acknowledging that Texas does issue driver’s licenses, Perry made clear 
that they do so because of the state’s sovereign authority and that the 
“secretary’s directive does not undermine or change our state laws.”158 
Texas’s skepticism of the lawfulness of the executive action conditions 
its willingness to cooperate. It likely contributes to Texas’s subsequent 
enlistment as lead plaintiff in the Texas v. United States litigation. 
D. Involuntary Cooperation
Until January 2015, Arizona was one of only two states that declined
to offer driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries and defended its state 
policy in several rounds of litigation that reached the Supreme Court 
before being permanently enjoined in federal district court.159 In direct 
response to DACA’s announcement in 2012, Arizona Governor Jan 
Brewer issued her own executive order stating that Arizona would not 
issue driver’s licenses to DACA recipients for reasons similar to North 
153. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.142(a) (West 2013).
154. See sources cited supra note 98.
155. See Helene N. Dang, supra note 98.
156. Letter from Rick Perry to Greg Abbott, supra note 100. Governor Perry is
presumably referring to the same Texas state law extending licenses that he tried to veto by 
proclamation. 
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. The other uncooperative state is Nebraska, which has a similar law barring DACA
recipients from licenses that was challenged in state court. The passage of new legislation 
permitting driver’s licenses, over a veto from the Nebraska Governor, mooted the state court 
litigation. Act of May 28, 2015, 2015 Neb. Laws L.B. 623. 
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Carolina’s for reaching the opposite conclusion that executive action 
necessitated the DMV’s acceptance of DACA documentation.160 
Governor Brewer argued that Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum could 
have no preemptive effect on Arizona state law.161 Brewer’s 
announcement was codified in Arizona state law that allowed noncitizens 
to use EAD’s as proof of eligibility for driver’s licenses while specifically 
denying DACA recipients.162 
The federal district court initially agreed with Governor Brewer, 
holding that the Arizona laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
and were not preempted by DACA163: 
The memorandum does not have the force of law. Although the 
Supreme Court has recognized that federal agency regulations ‘with the 
force of law’ can preempt conflicting state requirements, federal 
regulations have the force of law only when they prescribe substantive 
rules and are promulgated through congressionally-mandated 
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking. Secretary 
Napolitano’s memorandum does not purport to establish substantive 
rules (in fact, it says that it does not create substantive rights) and it was 
not promulgated through any formal administrative procedure. As a 
result, the memorandum does not have the force of law and cannot 
preempt state law or policy.164 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that Arizona’s state law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause,165 and on remand, the federal district court 
ordered the Arizona Department of Transportation to stop denying 
licenses to DACA recipients.166 Once the federal courts chimed in on the 
160. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06, Re-Affirming Intent of Arizona Law in Response
to the Federal Government’s Deferred Action Program (Aug. 15, 2012); see also Letter from 
Grayson G. Kelley to Eric Boyette, supra note 105. 
161. Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ September 17, 2013 Complaint for Declaratory
Relief and Injunctive Relief and Demand for a Jury Trial, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer 
(Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I), 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2013), (No. CV-12-02546-
PHX-DGC), rev’d, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014), remanded 81 F. Supp. 3d 795 (D. Ariz. 
2015). 
162. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. I, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-3153(D) (2013) (“[T]he department shall not issue . . . or renew a driver license . . . for a
person who does not submit proof satisfactory to the department that the applicant’s presence
in the United States is authorized under federal law.”)).
163. Id. at 1057–60.
164. Id. at 1059 (citations omitted).
165. Ariz. Dream Act Coal v. Brewer (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II), 757 F.3d 1053 (9th
Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit left open the question of DACA’s preemptive legal effect. Id. It 
is difficult to say that the courts vindicated DACA’s legality over Arizona law. It requested 
supplemental briefing on preemption on July 23, 2015. Id. 
166. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. III), 81 F. Supp. 3d 795,
811 (D. Ariz. 2015), appeal filed. On remand, the district court in Arizona granted relief for 
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legality of the program, Arizona permitted DACA recipients to receive 
licenses. However, its lackluster program implementation, continued ban 
on driver’s licenses to non-DACA deferred action recipients, and its 
participation as a plaintiff in the Texas v. United States litigation suggests 
that a declaration of legality has not led to voluntary cooperation so much 
as involuntary cooperation with the law.167 Absent a true sense of 
legitimacy, it is not surprising that Arizona only barely complied—
following the letter of the law, but circumventing its spirit of cooperation. 
Cooperation following direct legal challenge is a stark test for the extent 
to which legality constrains cooperation in the face of continuing dissent. 
It suggests that legality is a serious obstacle to cooperation (especially 
when legal pronouncements encroach on legitimacy perceptions), even if 
it is not insurmountable. It also suggests that legitimacy has continuing 
effects on cooperation even after legality is resolved. 
The case study of driver’s licenses is merely one example of state 
policymaking that voluntarily incorporates federal immigration policy, a 
far reaching phenomenon that could be extended to other state policies. 
Other than granting proof of personal identity and driving ability, driver’s 
licenses serve a host of practical and equally important symbolic 
purposes. Driver’s licenses allow immigrants to get registered and 
insured so that they can get to work and conduct their affairs, e.g., 
opening bank accounts, paying taxes, obtaining library cards, and cashing 
checks.168 Some call driver’s licenses “breeder documents” because the 
document becomes the basis for so many other proofs.169 Consequently, 
the driver’s license case study is an entrée into states’ voluntary 
incorporation of federal lawful presence designations to administer a 
variety of public benefits to undocumented immigrants. Similar support 
for DACA recipients exists in many state policies that reference DACA, 
as seen in the brief case study of states policies providing access to higher 
education to DACA recipients. State policies on health care contrast 
the plaintiffs, and ordered the state’s Department of Transportation to issue driver’s licenses 
to DACA beneficiaries. Id. 
167. Associated Press, Low Turnout for DREAMers Driver’s Licenses in Arizona,
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/3/low-
turnout-for-dreamers-drivers-licenses-in-arizo/. 
168. See Kari E. D’Ottavio, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Why Granting
Driver’s Licenses to DACA Beneficiaries Makes Constitutional and Political Sense, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 931, 964 (2013); María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State
Restrictions on the Use of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 92 (2005);
Kevin Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights 
Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 222–24 (2004).
169. See Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 830 (2015); CRAIG 
ROBERTSON, PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT (2010). 
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sharply, with only a handful of states incorporating DACA recipients. Put 
together, the vignettes of state policies on driver’s licenses, higher 
education, and health care show that cooperative state policymaking 
varies along a spectrum. These “shadow case studies” merit additional 
attention because the plaintiff-states in Texas v. United States cite the 
economic burden of administering driver’s licenses and other benefits as 
reasons to enjoin the related DAPA program from taking effect.170 
B. Higher Education for DACA Recipients
Congress in 1996 enacted two laws that limit states’ ability to offer 
higher education to undocumented immigrants. The welfare reform bill 
restricts the award of a public benefit such as a tuition subsidy unless 
states enact laws that “affirmatively provide” eligibility to undocumented 
immigrants.171 Many states exercise this option.172 Doing so requires 
states to enact policies that abide by an additional constraint from a 
federal immigration law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which expressly restricts access to 
postsecondary education benefits for undocumented students on the basis 
of their residency in the state.173 States turn to eligibility requirements 
other than residency per se, such as DACA’s “lawful presence” (which 
includes a durational residence requirement), to enact state policies to 
benefit undocumented immigrant students.174 Most colleges admit 
170. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616–17 (S.D. Texas 2015), aff’d, No.
15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257.
(“The States allege that the DHS Directive will directly cause significant economic injury to
their fiscal interests.”).
171. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act says that
any alien who is not legally in the country “is not eligible for any State or local public benefit” 
and defines public benefit defined to include tuition subsidies. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c)(1)(B) 
(2013). However, § 1621(d) offers an exception: it permits states to offer benefits to unlawful 
immigrants if they enact a state law that “affirmatively provides” for such eligibility. 8. U.S.C. 
§ 1621(d).
172. See generally Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 463 (2012); Stephen L. Nelson et al., Administrative DREAM Acts and Piecemeal 
Policymaking: Examining State Higher Education Governing Board Policies Regarding In-
State Tuition for Undocumented Immigrant Students, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 555 (2014); 
Institute for Higher Education Law and Governance, UNIV. HOUS. L. CTR., 
http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (tracking legislative changes and 
litigation on in-state tuition for undocumented and DACA students at this website); Table: 
Laws & Policies Improving Access to Higher Education for Immigrants, NAT’L IMMIGR. L.
CTR., http://www.nilc.org/eduaccesstoolkit2a.html#tables (last updated June 6, 2015). 
173. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
174. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
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undocumented immigrants with lawful presence under at least some 
circumstances.175 A large number of states permit undocumented students 
with lawful presence to pay in-state tuition rates.176 A handful of states 
make undocumented students with lawful presence eligible for state 
financial aid.177 
Just because a state can rely on the DACA lawful presence proxy in 
this way, though, does not mean that it will. Two brief examples 
demonstrate the point. Virginia permits DACA recipients to obtain in-
state tuition under its general tuition classification policies.178 Its 
rationale is based on two normative commitments. Procedurally, existing 
state guidance extends to those with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), 
a federally-issued designation comparable to deferred action that 
qualifies the recipient for in-state tuition. Substantively, DACA 
recipients are “already Virginians in some important ways.”179 The 
analogy between DACA and TPS underscores Virginia’s concern with 
fair and consistent administration of the law. North Carolina took the 
opposite approach and interpreted its general tuition classification statute 
to exclude DACA recipients from its residency requirements upon 
clarifying that tuition was a matter of state policy, not federal mandate.180 
175. Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina do not admit undocumented immigrants to at
least some of their state college systems, regardless of lawful presence or DACA status. Maps: 
State Laws and Policies on Access to Higher Education for Immigrants, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. 
CTR., http://www.nilc.org/eduaccesstoolkit2.html#maps (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).  
176. As of July 2014, twenty states classify DACA recipients as in-state residents
through their tuition policies: sixteen by state legislation and four by university policy. 
Gilberto Mendoza, Tuition Benefits for Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG. (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/tuition-benefits-for-immigrants.aspx; NAT’L
IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 161. 
177. California and Texas offer state financial aid. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5
(West 2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2012); NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra 
note 175. 
178. On April 29, 2014, the Virginia Attorney General advised the state’s public
colleges that DACA recipients may receive in-state tuition. Letter from Mark Herring, Att’y 
Gen. of Va. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.schev.edu/finaid/DACAAGAdviceLetter.pdf. The 
Attorney General elaborated that “no provision of state or federal law precludes individuals 
approved under DACA from . . . establishing domicile and qualifying for in-state tuition in 
accordance with Virginia Code § 23-7.4.” Id. According to this interpretation, DACA 
furnishes evidence of “intent to stay indefinitely,” which is relevant to establishing domicile, 
even if it is not a residency determination. Id. 
179. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, Undocumented Immigrants in Virginia Can Now Qualify for
In-State Tuition, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2014, 9:00 A.M.), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
immigration/2014/04/30/3432220/daca-recipients-virginia-in-state-tuition/. 
180. Letter from Hon. Marcus Brandon, Representative, N.C. Gen. Assembly, to Roy
Cooper, Attorney Gen. of N.C. (Dec. 18, 2013) (requesting written opinion on eligibility for 
in-state tuition for undocumented students who graduated from North Carolina schools with 
and without DACA.).  
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North Carolina’s Attorney General preferred to not unfairly displace U.S. 
citizen residents with undocumented students as a matter of its own 
executive discretion, preferring to instead defer to state laws that do not 
affirmatively provide such benefits.181 But this interpretation of tuition 
rates as a state legislature’s prerogative obviated the need to consider 
consistency across federal designations.182 Given that Virginia and North 
Carolina interpreted similarly-worded statutes differently, legal analysis 
is insufficient to explain their divergent policy outcomes. Legitimacy, 
premised on a sense of fairness and consistency across federal law, played 
a part as well. 
C. Health Care for DACA Recipients
In contrast to state policies permitting DACA recipients access to 
driver’s licenses and higher education, state policies provide less health 
care coverage for undocumented immigrants. The reason is that 
undocumented immigrants are excluded from nearly every form of 
federally-funded health care.183 Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
undocumented immigrants are not permitted to purchase insurance from 
the state insurance exchanges unless they are lawfully present.184 Even 
then, the ACA generally provides care to undocumented immigrants only 
in extreme circumstances such as emergency care or for low-income 
pregnant women and children.185 Moreover, a 2012 U.S. Department of 
181. The North Carolina Attorney General advised that legislative changes to the state’s 
residency laws were a preferable way to change residency requirements, if desired. Letter 
from Roy Cooper, Attorney Gen. of N.C., to Hon. Marcus Brandon, Representative, N.C. 
Gen. Assembly (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.wral.com/asset/news/state/nccapitol/2014/01/23/ 
13322333/Brandon-Rep-Marcus-1-22-2014.pdf.  
182. Although the Attorney General’s opinion is not binding on the university system,
it is influential. 
183. Generally, noncitizens have been ineligible for federal health care other than
emergency care since the 1996 welfare reforms in PRWORA. Clarissa A. Gomez, Note, The 
Paradox Between U.S. Immigration Policy and Health Care Reform: “Deferred Action For 
Childhood Arrivals”, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 99, 103, 110 (2013). Qualified immigrants 
could receive health care in qualified health plans within the state insurance exchanges, 
Medicaid the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and federally qualified health 
clinics but the definition of qualified includes only LPRs, refugees, asylees, parolees, and 
victims of certain human rights abuses. Id. at 104. 
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(d)(1) (2012) (defining eligible individual as a citizen or
national who is lawfully present). 
185. The general background of low-income health insurance under Medicaid and
Children’s Health Insurance Program and emergency care under the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act is summarized in Key Facts on Health Coverage for Low-
Income Immigrants Today and Under the Affordable Care Act, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID
& UNINSURED (March 2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/ 
8279-02.pdf. 
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Health and Human Services (HHS) regulation carved out from those 
lawfully present and thus potentially eligible, those who received 
deferred action through the DACA program.186 The unconventional 
regulation means that DACA recipients receive less health care coverage 
than other similarly-situated undocumented immigrants and the same 
coverage as if they had no documentation at all.187 
States have limited avenues to serve DACA recipients and 
undocumented immigrants due to these legal constraints, but a few states 
with large immigrant populations do offer care. As a classic example of 
cooperative federalism, the federal government sets the basic terms for 
Medicaid and then states have an opportunity to alter the eligibility 
requirements for “qualified immigrants” provided they use state funds to 
cover care.188 Although the HHS regulation excludes DACA recipients 
from the Permanently Residing in the United States Under Color of Law 
(PRUCOL) definition of “qualified,” three states use alternative avenues 
to render them eligible.189 California, through its state HHS, issued a 
letter clarifying that DACA recipients are eligible for full-scope Medi-
Cal if they meet all other requirements because their deferred action 
status is listed among California’s existing PRUCOL categories.190 This 
state definition circumvents the federal definition of PRUCOL and 
186. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(8) (excepting from lawfully present individuals with deferred
action under DACA). 
187. Id. § 152.2(4)(vi). The HHS regulation clarified that individuals granted deferred
action through DACA were not considered “lawfully present” under the law. Id. at § 152.2(8); 
see 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d)(3) (2013). 
188. “Qualified” immigrants can receive non-emergency forms of federal health care if
they are LPRs or those with enumerated humanitarian relief—such as refugees, veterans, 
active duty military, pregnant women, and children—and meet entry date, low-income, and 
durational residency requirements. See Vinita Andrapalliyal, “Healthcare for All”? The Gap 
Between Rhetoric and Reality in the Affordable Care Act, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58,
63–64 (2013). States use PRUCOL (persons residing under color of law) to alter the 
designation.  
189. California, New York, and Illinois offer DACA health care. Michael K. Gusmano,
Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: U.S. Health Policy and Access to Care, 
HASTINGS CTR. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.undocumentedpatients.org/issuebrief/health-
policy-and-access-to-care; Laurel Lucia et al., Health Insurance and Demographics of 
California Immigrants Eligible for Deferred Action, UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POL’Y RES. 
(March 2015), http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/publications/Documents/PDF/2015/immigrants-
policy-brief-mar2015.pdf. 
190. Letter from Tara Naisbitt, Chief of Medi-Cal Eligibility Div., to All Cty. Welfare
Dirs. and All Cty. Medi-Cal Program Specialists/Liaisons (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Documents/MEDIL%20I13-04.pdf 
(“Deferred action status is listed among the existing Permanently Residing in the United 
States Under Color of Law (PRUCOL) categories that are eligible for state-funded full scope 
Medi-Cal (See Title 22, California Code of Regulations (CCR) § 50301.3(I)).”). 
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renders DACA recipients eligible for some state-funded programs.191 
California’s efforts to cover DACA recipients, despite federal law, stem 
from its strong normative commitments and substantive policy criticism 
that the federal health care law is too harsh. New York similarly covers 
undocumented immigrants through Medicaid via a state redefinition of 
PRUCOL and the use of state funds.192 While New York may share some 
of California’s pro-immigrant views, New York’s policy is supported by 
longstanding legal precedent dictating that denying health care coverage 
to immigrants violates the state constitution’s provision of “aid, care and 
support of the needy” and notions of fairness and equal protection.193 The 
ability of California and New York to enact state policies that help DACA 
recipients despite important differences in their legal conditions suggests 
that law is not functioning alone to explain their policy outcomes. 
Compared to the national landscape of state health care policies for 
undocumented immigrants, these anomalies illustrate that legitimacy and 
morality are equally important in determining state policymaking 
outcomes. 
* * *
Systematic comparison of how and why states rely on or restrict 
DACA in their own policymaking is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, some preliminary observations can be shared based on a 
comparison of case studies. The case studies suggest parallels between 
states’ normative motivations, both procedural and substantive, for 
cooperating with DACA on state driver’s licenses and state higher 
education and tuition policies. Given a compelling reason, states are 
willing to take affirmative steps to overcome the apparent legal 
constraints presented by REAL ID, Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and IIRIRA. The studies 
also reveal the exceptional status of state health care policies. The scarcity 
of state health care policies benefitting DACA recipients is derived from 
the legal constraint of the federal ACA’s exclusion of DACA recipients. 
The anomalous states that provide health care to DACA recipients in this 
constrained legal environment strain to do so without federal support. 
191. Medi-Cal Eligibility and Covered California—Frequently Asked Questions, CAL.
DEP’T HEALTH CARE SERVS., http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/ 
Medi-CalFAQs2014b.aspx (last modified June 24, 2015, 9:30 AM). 
192. N.Y. IMMIGRANT COAL., MAXIMIZING HEALTH CARE REFORM FOR NEW YORK’S 
IMMIGRANTS 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.thenyic.org/sites/default/files/NYSHF_Immigration 
Coalition%20final%20Feb%202013%20%282%29.pdf. 
193. Due to Aliessa v. Novello, New York’s health insurance for immigrants pre-existed
DACA and the ACA. See 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098–99 (N.Y. 2001). In Aliessa, New York’s 
highest court found that denying care to undocumented immigrants violates Article XVII of 
the New York State Constitution and the federal and state equal protection clause. Id.  
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Thus, state cooperation depends on a combination of perceived 
legitimacy, legal opportunity, and moral commitment. The ability to 
overcome legal constraints is an important factor, partly because it helps 
to legitimize the policy, but legality is neither decisive nor automatic as 
a factor unto itself. 
IV. LIMITATIONS ON LEGITIMACY
Most of this Article has discussed legal, sociological, and moral 
legitimacy as separate strands of a broader phenomenon for analytical 
purposes. The case studies of state driver’s licensing focused extensively 
on sociological legitimacy in a policy domain where relatively few legal 
challenges have been raised in the states. Where challenges have been 
raised, nearly all resolved in favor of DACA. Part IV extends the core 
analysis to reflect on the limits of legitimacy as revealed in ongoing 
litigation over DAPA, the executive policy expanding DACA to a 
broader class of immigrants in November 2014 that is awaiting Supreme 
Court review. Because the DAPA program was enjoined before taking 
effect, a case study of on-the-ground acceptance equivalent to state 
driver’s licenses is not possible. However, this Part uses hypotheticals 
and counterfactual analysis to examine differences and similarities in 
legitimacy arguments applied to a program under serious legal challenge 
as compared to one with relatively uncontested legality. Part IV.A 
examines the relationship between legitimacy and legality in the legal 
arguments over DAPA in Texas v. United States; Part IV.B examines the 
relationship between legitimacy and morality using the contemplated but 
never adopted version of DAPA, which would have benefited the parents 
of DACA recipients and not merely LPRs and citizens. 
A. Texas v. United States and Legal Challenges to DAPA
The November 2014 expansion of the DACA program includes a 
DAPA program that provides temporary protection from deportation and 
lawful presence during the period of protection to parents of U.S. citizens 
and LPR children.194 The program relies on the same sources of legal 
authority as the 2012 DACA: the President’s executive authority to 
exercise enforcement discretion and congressionally-delegated authority 
under the INA and immigration regulations.195 DAPA is similar to DACA 
in its purpose. Its eligibility requirements benefit a broader group of 
194. See Johnson Memo Nov. 2014, supra note 12, at 3. While the November 2014
executive action entails both an expansion of DACA to a broader class of childhood arrivals 
and the creation of DAPA for parents, the focus of this section is on DAPA. 
195. See supra Part I.B.
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undocumented immigrants who crossed the border as adults. The OLC 
and the White House, during the announcement of the 2014 programs, 
invoked the policy goal of promoting family unity by providing 
temporary protection from deportation for the parents.196 The application 
process for both programs is similarly centralized in the USCIS, with 
guidance enumerating criteria for case-by-case decisions, although the 
DAPA application leaves more discretion to federal officials.197 
Shortly after the DAPA program’s announcement in November 
2014, a coalition of states filed a lawsuit seeking to block implementation 
of the DAPA program that they deemed both illegitimate and illegal.198 
The issue in Texas v. United States was whether DAPA violates the 
Constitution’s Take Care Clause and the APA’s rulemaking 
requirements.199 Primarily on the basis of the APA procedural claim, a 
Texas federal district court judge temporarily enjoined the 
Administration from accepting new applications on February 16, 2015, 
less than two days before the program’s planned start.200 After resolving 
standing and reviewability in favor of the plaintiff-states, the district court 
focused on the plaintiff-states’ claim that DAPA exceeds its delegated 
authority because it accomplishes its goals in violation of the APA 
rulemaking requirements.201 The district court rejected the Obama 
Administration’s reply that DAPA is “not a rule, but a policy that 
‘supplements and amends . . . guidance’” and therefore is subject to an 
APA exemption.202 The 123-page memorandum opinion accompanying 
the nationwide preliminary injunction against implementation of DAPA 
provided a detailed discussion of the legal tests used to determine whether 
an agency action is “substantive,” rendering it ineligible for the 
196. OLC Memo, supra note 15 at 26.
197. See Part I.A.
198. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2015), aff’d,
No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 
207257. While Texas v. United States challenges both the DHS memo containing both 2014 
DACA and 2014 DAPA, the focus here is on DAPA because the reasoning in the 
memorandum opinion and order is almost entirely on DAPA. See id. at 606–07. Also, the 
memorandum opinion states in a section titled “issues before and not before the court,” “with 
three minor exceptions, this case does not involve the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(‘DACA’) program.” Id. at 606 (emphasis added). 
199. Id. at 607, 614 (describing three discrete legal issues: standing, Take Care Clause
violation, and APA rulemaking violation). 
200. Id. at 616-44 (standing), 664-72.
201. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 665–66; see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing delegated
authority and APA section 553(b) rulemaking requirements, also known as notice and 
comment procedures). 
202. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 665 n.86; see supra Part I.B.2 (analyzing legal aspects of
delegated authority and APA). 
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rulemaking exemptions,203 before concluding that DAPA was 
procedurally invalid as enacted.204 Obama sought an emergency stay of 
the district court injunction pending resolution of the merits in the Fifth 
Circuit. A motions panel denied the stay.205 A second panel, reviewing 
the district court’s order, affirmed the injunction on the merits primarily 
emphasizing the USCIS’s noncompliance with APA rulemaking 
procedures; it essentially conceded the executive’s enforcement 
discretion to administer deferred action.206 The dissents in the Fifth 
Circuit merits proceeding concluded that the DAPA Guidance involved 
non-reviewable matters of agency discretion and would not be subject to 
the APA rulemaking requirements if implemented in the manner 
prescribed by the USCIS.207 The Obama Administration appealed, and it 
is now awaiting review in the U.S. Supreme Court.208 Meanwhile, in 
related lawsuits, Crane v. Johnson and Arpaio v. Obama, Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials and an Arizona sheriff 
respectively challenged the DACA program and were dismissed by the 
Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit respectively for lack of standing.209 These 
lawsuits make it critical to examine the limits of legitimacy in situations 
where legitimacy abuts challenges to a federal policy’s legality. 
The premise of the Part III case studies is that states granting driver’s 
licenses or in-state tuition rates to DACA recipients accept the legitimacy 
of DACA as having been fairly and respectably enacted. Part of the 
reason why, is that they also presume the program is lawful and that the 
legality legitimates the policy, even if this additional grounds for 
acceptance is not immediate or automatic. In contrast, the lawfulness of 
its legacy program, DAPA, is more hotly contested. The Article is not 
deciding on the DAPA program’s legality so much as thinking through 
203. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 670 (finding that DAPA has a binding effect on the
agency). 
204. Id. at 671–72. The district court issued an order declining to lift the injunction on
Apr. 7, 2015. Texas v. United States, Civ. No. B–14–254, 2015 WL 1540022, at *8 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 7, 2015). 
205. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
206. Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015).
Supplementing the reasoning of the district court, the Fifth Circuit added that the DAPA 
Guidance is “manifestly contrary” to the INA. Id. at *22–23. 
207. Id. at *27–28 (King, J. dissenting). The dissent considered the court’s rulings on
substantive violation of the APA improvidently reached and wrong on the merits. 
208. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No.
15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257.
209. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2015) (DACA challenge dismissed
because the state of Mississippi and ICE officers lacked standing); Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 
11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (DAPA challenge dismissed because the plaintiff, the sheriff of 
Maricopa County, Arizona, lacked standing). 
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the consequences of a finding that it is or is not. The litigation raises 
issues that are analytically prior to the states whose policies permit 
licensing, tuition, or health care for DACA recipients. 
All in all, the Fifth Circuit majority raises doubts about DAPA that 
center on legality without needing to invoke deeper issues of legitimacy. 
First, the majority complains of APA procedural defects that would 
ultimately be curable if the Obama Administration utilized the notice and 
comment rulemaking procedures.210 The insinuation that the DAPA 
program operates on pretext questions the motives of the Obama 
Administration and impugns its legitimacy, though the factual foundation 
for these assertions is shaky.211 Second, the Fifth Circuit’s sua sponte 
finding of a substantive APA violation might invoke deeper legitimacy 
concerns, but it requires some clarification. The court could be saying 
that the use of a statutory exception to effectuate a “nonstatus” that is 
accompanied by a substantive benefit is a legal loophole; this is not an 
affront to the rule of law.212 If instead DAPA is a misuse of that exception 
to reclassify a group that Congress has defined, there is a stronger claim 
of circumventing Congressional will.213 Third, the Constitutional 
challenge to the Obama Administration’s executive authority to defer 
deportations invokes the most serious challenge: it is the kind of 
foundational claim that abets grave doubt and intertwines legality with 
legitimacy. However, it is possible to read the Fifth Circuit as 
acknowledging the President’s executive discretion to defer deportation, 
even if the means used to exercise that discretion were deficient.214 
Although it listed the issue as a question for review, the Supreme Court 
seems unlikely to reverse that interpretation of executive discretion over 
210. Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19–21.
211. Id. at *28, 41–42 (King, J dissenting) (“the district court concluded on its own—
prior to DAPA’s implementation, based on improper burden-shifting, and without seeing the 
need even to hold an evidentiary hearing—that the Memorandum is a sham, a mere ‘pretext’ 
for the Executive’s plan ‘not [to] enforce the immigration laws as to over four million illegal 
aliens.’ That conclusion is clearly erroneous. The majority affirms and goes one step further 
today.”) (citing Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2015)). 
212. Id. at *22–23. The Government defends the work permit as being independently
authorized by regulations. Petition for A Writ of Certiorari, Texas, et al. v. United States, et 
al., No. 15-674 (Nov. 20, 2015) at 26. 
213. The dissent forcefully rejected the substantive APA violation as nonjusticeable
and improvidently reviewed. It also argued that, if reviewable, the violations were wrongly 
found. Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *47–50 (King, J., dissenting). 
214. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190
(petition for cert. filed Nov. 20, 2015) (No. 15-674) (“The court of appeals majority 
acknowledged that the Secretary has discretion to decide to forbear from removing every alien 
who could benefit under the Guidance, even though the majority questions the Secretary’s 
authority to confer work authorization without following notice and comment procedures.”). 
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immigration enforcement given its recent decisions.215 
Court watchers are mistaken if they assume that the Fifth Circuit 
settled DAPA’s legitimacy in the states. A win most critically would have 
provided the opportunity for states to implement DAPA—setting up the 
empirical test of the program’s legitimacy, rather than furnishing the 
results. But a loss in the Fifth Circuit did not necessarily delegitimize the 
program, even if it prevented the states from having an opportunity to 
enact voluntary policies in response to DAPA implementation. Legal 
losses will only delegitimize contested policies in distinctive 
circumstances. Even those who disagreed with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore acknowledged President Bush as president for 
two presidential terms and obeyed his laws.216 For similar reasons, a 
tangle in the appeals courts will not by itself render DAPA illegitimate. 
Every policy taken up for Supreme Court review is not illegitimate, even 
if the litigation delays program implementation and impedes states from 
formulating their on-the-ground response.217 
If the Supreme Court finds Obama’s DAPA program deficient and 
suggests a procedural fix that permits the DAPA program to be eventually 
implemented, state cooperation may follow despite initial doubts about 
the legal or moral rightness of the program. For example, the Court could 
find illegality that turns on a procedural defect that can be cured by 
publishing the existing guidance memo in the Federal Register and 
accepting public comments as prescribed by APA section 553(b) or by 
revisiting the legal foundation of the benefits that accompany it.218 Only 
if the Court perceives a grave problem—such as lacking executive 
authority or an incurable substantive APA violation—would President 
Obama confront the conceptual quandary of delegitimization. A future 
executive action could alter the parameters in a way that satisfies the 
215. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No.
15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. The
Supreme Court upheld broad powers of federal immigration enforcement in Arizona v United
States.
216. The example of those who disagree with Bush v. Gore will still acknowledge the
President and follow his laws, unless they believe them to be a grave injustice, comes from 
Fallon, supra note 59, at 1794. An edited volume uses a similar analogy between Bush v. Gore 
and the legitimacy vs. legality distinction. BUSH V. GORE, supra note 59, at 36–37. 
217. This is roughly the sequence of events in Texas v. United States, in which a federal
judge issued a temporary injunction of the 2014 DACA extension and 2014 DAPA program 
on Feb. 16, 2015, which is being reviewed. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603, 
677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. 
granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
218. These policy prescriptions are not required by law, even if they might be advisable. 
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), 
(c) (2014)); see infra notes 264–267.
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Court or Congress could intervene. Even without intervention, the Court 
could pronounce DAPA unsound without causing states to disrespect the 
lawful presence component of DAPA that serves as an eligibility criteria 
in the fashioning of many other state policies. Lawful presence is not 
unique to DAPA, even if it is made famous by it. And states can choose 
to recognize it or not within cooperative federalism schemes that leave 
the specifics of state policy to the states. 
The temptation to equate legality with legitimacy is understandable, 
but the two terms are not co-extensive. Even if the two terms seem 
intertwined in a system of judicial precedent that considers past legal 
interpretations as one source of legitimate authority,219 it is certainly not 
always or automatically the case. And the intertwining is not assured 
under these circumstances. Presumably this is why the Obama 
Administration characterizes DAPA’s delays in court as being a bump in 
the road over a mere technicality.220 In a Florida town hall, defending his 
executive action shortly after Judge Hanen enjoined the DAPA program 
in the district court, President Obama spoke directly to immigrants, 
reassuring them that those who would have qualified for DAPA should 
remain confident that they will not be deported given that DHS Secretary 
Johnson’s Memo on Enforcement Priorities remains in effect.221 
Immediately after the district court injunction President Obama said, 
“Even with legal uncertainty . . . they should be in a good place.”222 He 
has continued to make similar statements at each stage of litigation.223 
219. Fallon explains this partly as the product of a tradition of precedent/stare decisis
in which past legal interpretations constitute a source of legitimate authority. Fallon, supra 
note 59, at 1793. It is also partly a product of strategic uses of illegitimacy. Id. at 1818 
(“[W]hereas an ascription of legal legitimacy often claims less than that a judicial judgment 
was correct, an allegation of illegitimacy almost invariably implies more than that a legal 
judgment was merely incorrect.”) (emphasis added). 
220. Jethro Mullen & Jeremy Diamond, Obama Vows to Abide by Immigration Court
Order, CNN (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/17/politics/texas-
obama-immigration-injunction (DHS Sec’y Jeh Johnson: “We fully expect to ultimately 
prevail in the courts, and we will be prepared to implement DAPA and expanded DACA once 
we do.”). Then Attorney General Eric Holder referred to the ruling as an “interim step.” 
Reuters, Holder: Tex. Judge’s Decision on Immigration ‘An Interim Step’, WASH. POST (Feb. 
17, 2015, 6:56 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/politics/holder-tex-judges-
decision-on-immigration-an-interim-step/2015/02/17/a17523d4-b6ef-11e4-bc30-
a4e75503948a_video.html. 
221. Johnson Memo Nov. 2014, supra note 12; Press Release, The White House, Fact
Sheet: Immigration Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-
executive-action. 
222. Julie H. Davis, Visiting Miami, Obama Presses Republicans on Homeland
Security Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/us/ 
politics/obama-hopes-to-score-points-in-miami-on-immigration.html?_r=1. 
223. The day after the Fifth Circuit ruling, the White House announced its intention to
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His projected confidence indicates that he believes, at the end of the day, 
that his programs will be declared not only legal but legitimate so that 
immigrants will be willing to participate and states will continue to 
voluntarily cooperate on-the-ground. Given that “most people obey most 
laws, most of the time,” he is probably right.224 And while there is always 
the possibility that a future president can overturn the program “with the 
stroke of a pen,” there is the political difficulty of rolling back an 
established program, once it is in place.225 
It is certainly possible that protracted litigation will raise doubts 
about DAPA so grave as to trigger a cascade of noncooperation in the 
states. For example, a Supreme Court decision permitting DAPA to be 
implemented without affirming its Constitutional merit (i.e. because the 
states lack standing or the courts lack reviewability) could cast the DAPA 
program in a shroud such that states do not voluntarily go along with it. 
The cascade could indirectly extend to state support for DACA if the legal 
issues implicate issues common to both programs.226 So far, this has not 
happened during lower court review. States continue to issue licenses to 
DACA recipients and have in increasing numbers expanded eligibility to 
all undocumented immigrants.227 
appeal to the Supreme Court and proclaimed: “The immigration ruling is not consistent with 
the values of our country.” David Nakamura & Pamela Constable, Obama Administration to 
Seek Supreme Court Involvement in Immigration Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2015). In the 
government’s petition for certiorari, the White House maintains: “A divided court of appeals 
has upheld an unprecedented nationwide injunction against implementing a federal 
immigration enforcement policy of great national importance, and has done so in violation of 
established limits on the judicial power.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Texas v. United 
States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (petition for cert. filed Nov. 
20, 2015) (No. 281). 
224. Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson, & Mike Hough, Police Futures and Legitimacy:
Redefining ‘Good Policing’, in THE FUTURE OF POLICING 79, 85 (Jennifer M. Brown ed., 
2014).  
225. See A Guide to the Immigration Accountability Executive Action, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/guide-
immigration-accountability-executive-action (describing thirty-nine instances of presidential 
executive actions that remained in place despite changes in administration). But cf. Texas v. 
United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 610, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 
6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. (Judge Hanen’s order 
retracting DACA’s three-year renewals after they were prematurely granted). 
226. DACA 2012 is not under the preliminary injunction, so changes would not be
legally compelled. However, states who acquiesced to DACA by incorporating DACA’s 
lawful presence designation into their state driver’s license policies could withdraw their 
support in light of Texas’s specific mention of driver’s licenses, higher education, and health 
care as proof of injury by DAPA. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 617, 672. 
227. Deciding Who Drives: State Choices Surrounding Unauthorized Immigrants and
Driver’s Licenses, Pew Charitable Trusts (Aug. 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/ 
assets/2015/08/deciding-who-drives.pdf. 
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Just as importantly, public doubt could undermine the DACA and 
DAPA programs in another way. Indeed, some who want the program to 
succeed, and many who do not, interpret the intense scrutiny of DAPA’s 
legality and skepticism of the Obama Administration’s good faith as the 
undoing of the program. The Fifth Circuit’s characterization of the 
USCIS’s claims that they review DACA applications case-by-case as 
“pretext”228 and Judge Hanen’s court order rebuking the Administration 
for proceeding prematurely with three-year renewals of DACA work 
permits229 may not be legally fatal, but they undermine public confidence. 
This kind of doubt may fester notwithstanding President Obama's 
reassurance or community organizers exhorting immigrants eligible for 
DAPA to be patient, keep faith, and prepare their documents through the 
Si Se Puede Con DAPA (Yes We Can with DAPA) campaign.230 The 
mere fact of delay and the disruption in the program’s planned 
implementation is already shaping individual attitudes among those who 
might be eligible to apply. To some extent, all government programs rely 
on public participation for success.231 That is true to an even greater 
extent in DAPA, where applicants assume certain risks for disclosing to 
the federal government sensitive personal information, knowing that their 
lack of formal immigration status leaves them vulnerable to deportation 
at several junctures—if their application is denied, if their two-year 
protective period expires, or if the important elements of the program are 
withdrawn.232 Those who send in their applications exchange the risk of 
self-disclosure for the promise that they will be better off once the 
government grants them deferred action. In other words, they accept the 
228. Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19.
229. Judge Hanen ordered the Obama Administration to withdraw three-year renewals
of the 2012 DACA applications following revelations that USCIS had prematurely issued the 
three-year renewals while judicial proceedings on the 2014 executive actions were still 
pending. Order, Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (filed July 7, 2015) (No. 14-254), 
http://www.aila.org/File/Related/15070802a.pdf. DHS claimed the renewals were a 
misunderstanding, and required DACA recipients to return their work permits by July 31, 
2015. DACA Recipients Who Received 3-Year Work Permit Post-Injunction: Quick Facts, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/daca-recipients-who-
received-3-year-work-permit-post-injunction-quick-facts (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
230. See generally Suzanne Gamboa, Hopes on Hold: Dreamers Vent Anger Over
Immigration Ruling, NBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/ 
latino/hopes-hold-dreamers-vent-anger-over-immigration-ruling-n307516. 
231. TYLER, COOPERATE, supra note 8, at 81–89 (Chapter Five on Cooperation with
Political Authorities discusses public participation). 
232. During the Fifth Circuit hearing on the preliminary injunction, Judge Higginson
stated, “The first step toward removing them is getting them into the database. . . . It is scary 
for them. It is precarious to identify . . . They’re even telling us where they are. We’re finding 
the fugitives.” Oral Argument, Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 
2015), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/15/15-40238_7-10-2015.mp3.  
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trade-off once the USCIS and community organizations earn their trust 
and confidence that their personal information is safe and the program is 
stable, even if its permanence cannot be guaranteed. The trade-off is 
harder to make when the promised benefits are shrouded in doubt. Similar 
chilling effects might instill doubt and quell cooperation among the states 
that so far cooperate with DACA in their decisions to accept new EADs 
for the purpose of driver’s licenses and other benefits. However, informal 
pressure to maintain already-granted benefits might be strong enough that 
legality might not swallow legitimacy. Whether intentional or not, the 
Texas lawsuit draws attention to the risk of impermanence inherent in 
executive action and, for that matter, executive authority. Fixating on 
these features of the program makes it harder to accept the institutional 
legitimacy of the program on-the-ground. In that sense, judicial 
pronouncements that DHS violated procedural norms and the issuance of 
a preliminary injunction that disrupts the program’s stability could shape 
the program’s legitimacy on-the-ground. 
Still, if public confidence in the expanded DACA and DAPA 
programs begins to unravel, it will not likely be the result of a judicial 
pronouncement of illegality. It will instead be the result of the legitimacy 
concerns unveiled by the argument about the executive branch as a 
legitimate, fair, and trustworthy source of institutional authority. In this 
sense, whether or not the district court’s preliminary injunction 
withstands appeal and whether or not the procedural defect can be cured, 
the challenge is important—just not for the reasons assumed. By 
emphasizing procedural norms for agency rulemaking, the legal 
discussions surrounding the Texas litigation activate beliefs and conduct 
about the respect-worthiness of executive action accomplished in this 
way and for these purposes. Understood this way, the Administration’s 
claimed failure to abide by APA procedures gives rise to a foundational 
challenge on the legitimacy of the administrative state that issued 
DAPA—hardly a technicality, but also not an issue that necessarily 
dooms the program.233 The Texas lawsuit brings the legality and 
legitimacy frameworks into close relationship, even if the two cannot be 
equated. But more than justifying their conflation, the lawsuit sharpens 
the legitimacy framework presented as the lynchpin of executive action 
garnering acceptance on-the-ground. It does so by amplifying the 
relationship between law and legitimacy rather than by altering the 
233. Cass R. Sunstein, Texas Misjudges Obama on Immigration, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Feb. 17, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-17/what-the-
judge-got-wrong-about-obama-s-immigration-plan (arguing Judge Hanen was right to focus 
on technical requirements of the law, but that he got the technical argument wrong).  
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primary analysis advanced in this Article: legality matters because of the 
effect it has on perceptions of legitimacy, rather than for its own sake. 
B. OLC and Policy Challenges to DAPA and Deferred Action for DACA
Parents
The DAPA executive action also surfaces the relationship between
legitimacy and morality. As previously described, morality refers to 
substantive policy preferences such as a state’s stance on federal 
immigration policy.234 Moral and policy commitments are distinguished 
from political and partisan commitments that take positions on these and 
other issues for strategic reasons.235 
Notwithstanding the heated political discourse that has surrounded 
President Obama’s use of executive action in immigration law, the 
district court in Texas v. United States claimed that “the issues before the 
Court do not require the Court to consider the public popularity, public 
acceptance, public acquiescence, or public disdain for the DAPA 
program.”236 This Article largely agrees with the district court on the 
technical irrelevance of public popularity, though it parts ways on the 
relevance of acquiescence on-the-ground. Cooperation and acquiescence 
turn on more than substantive policy preferences just as it turns on more 
than legality. Among other things, cooperation turns on perceptions of 
legitimacy. Substantive policy preferences are not determinative in most 
cases, even if a correspondence between individual policy preferences 
and the content of a federal policy make it easier to accept the policy. 
The relationship between legitimacy and morality peeks through the 
DACA case studies of state cooperation. However, they are even more 
salient in the context of DAPA. DAPA is a more challenging policy to 
accept than DACA for most individuals. Unlike the childhood arrivals 
who benefit from DACA, the parents who benefit from the DAPA 
program, or the contemplated alternative, knowingly violated 
immigration law upon their entry. Many migrated for work, often without 
legal authorization, and garnered a reputation for accepting low wages 
and poor conditions that can lower the standards for U.S. citizen workers 
in similar jobs. Many sent for their children or began families after they 
arrived, with those children (pejoratively named anchor babies) 
becoming eligible for public benefits. Some used fraudulent documents 
234. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
235. Anil Kalhan provides thoughtful analysis of the conflation of political and legal in
his essay, supra note 129, at 64. 
236. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-
40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
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or falsified identities to evade detection from immigration authorities for 
many years. And living in the shadows makes many of them seem 
shadowy or enigmatic, as compared with DACA youth who have openly 
advocated for a federal DREAM Act in their graduation gowns, 
generating significant public support and enjoying some legal 
protection—notably, educational access to K-12 schools under Plyler v. 
Doe237 and state laws. In other words, unlike their children, DAPA 
recipients’ hands are not clean and their profile is not entirely 
sympathetic. Supporting the DAPA program without harboring sympathy 
for DAPA recipients is harder to do than supporting undocumented 
youth. Maintaining support for the federal program despite a personal 
distaste for the program’s recipients is even harder. On the other hand, 
being able to support the DAPA program, despite strong substantive 
disagreement, is an exemplar of how legitimacy independently facilitates 
voluntary cooperation. 
At an institutional level, it is similarly easier for a state to support a 
nonbinding federal policy when the policy goals overlap with the state’s 
autonomous goals rather than when they depart from them. Again, this 
Article assumes that states maintain choice and that their laws are not 
preempted or mandated by the federal policy.238 State support is also 
easier when the President aligns his executive actions with Congress’s 
intentions, both to minimize the scope of conflict and to make apparent 
the path of delegated authority. When the President does the same thing 
that Congress would do, the President is engaging in a straightforward 
use of delegated authority. When the President strikes out on his own or 
fills gaps in legislation, it is harder to trace the source of executive 
authority. The executive’s exercise of authority might actually be fine, 
but the straightforward delegation is easier to see and accept—and 
perceptions matter a great deal. The OLC memo defending Obama’s 
DAPA program emphasizes the legal arguments supporting the DAPA 
programs where the executive’s preferences align with Congress.239 The 
Obama Administration elaborates on this argument in subsequent 
briefings in Texas v. United States, claiming under the precedent of 
Heckler v. Chaney and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Commission, the DAPA program constitutes a valid exercise of 
enforcement discretion that is within the scope of congressional 
237. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (ruling that a state statute denying funding for K-12
education to undocumented immigrant children violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
238. Kim, supra note 82, at 702, 732; Rubenstein, supra note 82, at 114–15.
239. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 10 (“The policy DHS has proposed, moreover, is
consistent with the removal priorities established by Congress.”). 
2016] Beyond Legality 145 
delegation and the INA.240 Though the Administration relies on resource 
limitations as a partial justification for executive enforcement discretion, 
it is not the only justification. Presidents may advance their substantive 
policy preferences as well—for example, for humanitarian relief or for 
prioritization of “felons, not families” over other categories of 
immigrants.241 In the instances of executive policymaking through 
enforcement discretion, state support for DAPA is easiest to justify when 
the DAPA policy is supported by both Congress’s and the executive’s 
substantive policy preferences. 
States have the greatest difficulty accepting the legitimacy of 
executive action when the executive’s priorities appear to depart from 
Congress’s clearly-expressed preferences. Where the executive is 
exercising delegated authority and takes actions conflicting with that 
authority, the departure is clearly too much to withstand a legitimacy test; 
where the executive is relying on implied authority it is likely okay. What 
is less clear, Youngstown’s twilight zone, is when the executive enters 
territory where Congress is silent about its preferences.242 The Obama 
Administration (through OLC) argues Congress has either authorized or 
acquiesced that this would be the case in DAPA. They underscore the 
point by explaining their rejection of a contemplated policy of deferred 
action for DACA parents, precisely because it would stray too far from 
Congress’s expressed intent.243 The abandoned alternative version of 
DAPA would have expanded the beneficiary class to include DACA 
parents who lacked an independent basis for obtaining immigration-
related benefits, even after paying penalties and crediting multi-year 
delays. By way of contrast, the DAPA-eligible parents of U.S. citizens 
and LPRs would already be eligible for normalization of their status 
under enacted immigration statutes, though they would have to wait until 
their sponsoring child reached the age of eighteen. Under advisement 
from the OLC, the Obama Administration only adopted the more limited 
240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015
WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (petition for cert. filed Nov. 20, 2015) (No. 15-674); 
Brief for Appellants at 5–6, Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (No. 15-40238); 
Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 31, Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (Document 38). 
241. Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/ 
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.  
242. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (setting forth
broad three-pronged test of the boundaries of executive power, wherein the president may act 
in a twilight zone where executive authority is neither clearly present nor absent). 
243. OLC memo, supra note 15, at 9–11 (applying Youngstown and progeny to the
President’s exercise of enforcement discretion in DACA). 
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DAPA program that more closely matched congressional priorities.244 
OLC cautioned that policy precedents prohibit the grant of deferred action 
based on family ties unless those family members are “legally entitled to 
live in the United States.”245 Plaintiff-states in Texas v. United States 
disagree with the Obama Administration’s characterization of DAPA 
falling into the zone of twilight, arguing instead that Congress expressly 
laid out its charge to the DHS for immigration enforcement and that 
deviations from this charge—essentially, full enforcement—violate 
congressional intent.246 Moreover, the plaintiff-states argue that the 
INA’s lack of pathways to legalization for the parent of a child who 
possesses only temporary protection (in the form of deferred action) 
suggests that DAPA is out of sync with the design of the INA and 
contrary to Congress’s expressed intent.247 These legal objections are 
worthy of consideration. Still, they fail to acknowledge that the plaintiff-
states do not trust Obama’s motives for taking unilateral action, 
especially if they think the President is trying to circumvent Congress and 
undermine the rule of law. This is what Congress means when it says the 
President is usurping its power or thwarting the will of the people. The 
states might mean that the President’s theory of the Take Care Clause or 
APA rulemaking requirements is flawed (a legality argument), but more 
likely they mean that they do not trust a President who does alone what 
they believe could or should be done together (a legitimacy argument). It 
seems to them that President Obama is getting away with something. 
Following this logic, states given the option to enact policies supportive 
of DAPA would resist doing so if they felt the program was illegitimate, 
even if declared legal in court. 
In response to OLC and the White House defenses of DAPA, four 
influential immigration law professors penned a letter disagreeing with 
the OLC conclusions on the availability of relief for parents of DACA 
recipients as a legal matter and additionally asserting that the Family 
244. Id. at 25–33 (discussing deferred action for parents of U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident children). 
245. OLC Memo, supra note 15, at 32 (OLC reads the INA to encompass Congress’s
general concern for not separating individuals who are legally entitled to live in the United 
States from their immediate family members and then infers that such a reading precludes 
discretionary relief based on relationships to other family members). Some scholars disagree 
with this assessment, and argue that extending relief is permitted as an exercise of executive 
authority. 
246. Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 16, Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190
(5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (No. 15-40238) (“[W]e would expect to find an explicit delegation of 
authority to implement DAPA—a program that makes 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens 
eligible for lawful presence, work authorization, and associated benefits—but no such 
provision exists.”).  
247. Id.
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Fairness program accompanying the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) legalization constitutes a historical and policy 
precedent from another administration.248 The letter states that an 
undocumented immigrant who is the parent of a DACA recipient is not 
prohibited from obtaining deferred action by “law or history,” even if 
Congress has not expressed a clear preference for their protection.249 
“Any decision by the Administration to include or exclude certain groups 
will be a policy choice not a legal one.”250 The implication that 
administrative priorities must be consonant with congressional ones 
ignores valid constraints that operate independently of Congress’s 
priorities: administrative convenience, resource constraints, and respect 
for executive judgment among others. Professors Rodriguez, Cox, and 
Metzger refute this false syllogism and also note how strange it would be 
to inquire with Congress about prosecutors’ individual exercises of 
discretion in the criminal context.251 There is space for the President to 
express substantive policies, within a permissible range, while 
interpreting and enforcing immigration law. Obama chose not to reach 
the outer bounds of executive enforcement discretion when he adopted 
DACA and the more limited DAPA program rather than its contemplated 
alternative. This self-limitation displeased immigrant advocates who 
support humanitarian relief for long-time residents of the United States 
who lack status and who feel impatient with a Congress that has been 
slow to enact immigration reforms that would help undocumented youth. 
248. Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad et al., Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar & Clinical
Professor of Law, Pa. State Dickerson Sch. of Law, to Barack Obama, President, U.S. (Nov. 
3, 2014), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/WHLetterFinalNovember 
20142.pdf [hereinafter Sivaprasad Nov. 3 Letter] (clarifying that “there is no legal 
requirement that the executive branch limit deferred action or any other exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to individuals whose dependents are lawfully present in the United 
States”) (emphasis omitted). Several online symposium comments also address this point. In 
his Balkanization blog post, Stephen Legomsky also disputes the lack of precedent argument 
and observes that there is nothing in the INA that requires the conditions for permanent 
discretionary relief to match the Administration’s criteria for temporary relief. Stephen 
Legomsky, Why Can’t Deferred Action Be Given to the Parents of the Dreamers?, 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/why-cant-
deferred-action-be-given-to.html. He also observes that there are INA grounds for 
discretionary relief independent of family relations altogether. Id. 
249. Sivaprasad Nov. 3 Letter, supra note 248.
250. Id. at 3.
251. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 9; see Gillian Metzger, Must Enforcement
Discretion Be Exercised Case-by-Case?, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 24, 2014, 1:30 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/must-enforcement-discretion-be.html; Recent Executive 
Opinion: Immigration Law, Office of Legal Counsel Issues Opinion Endorsing President 
Obama’s Executive Order on Deferred Action for Parental Accountability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
2320, 2324–25 (2015); Peter Shane, The Presidential Statutory Stretch, 87 COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016); supra Part I.B. 
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These immigration advocates sought for the President to do everything in 
his power to fix immigration law, even if it meant acting alone. Based on 
the legitimacy framework, Obama’s self-limitation was a prudent way to 
reduce opposition and encourage willing cooperation among those who 
do not necessarily share his substantive policy preferences. In other 
words, self-limitation is a way to bolster the legitimacy of a contested 
policy. 
States enacting supportive policies acknowledge the legitimacy of 
DACA more easily when their substantive preferences correspond to the 
moral values embedded in the federal executive action. And states 
supporting DAPA in litigation have an easier time if supportive of the 
content of the executive action. However, the substantive correspondence 
is not necessary. The willingness to cooperate despite contrary 
substantive preferences is the paradigmatic case that illustrates 
legitimacy operating.252 The logic in this paradigmatic case is why this 
Article seeks to highlight variation within the fifty states that offer 
driver’s licenses to DACA recipients before showing how they come to 
cooperate. These case studies of states adopting cooperative policies 
despite their doubts (compliance dubitante and involuntary cooperation), 
represent clearer tests of legitimacy. It is also why the Article focuses 
more attention on the non-intuitive litigants in Texas v. United States: 
plaintiff-states with moderate views of immigration enforcement or 
supporters of Obama’s policies who would not typically favor 
immigrants.253 
Partisanship is distinct from morality in the sense of substantive 
policy preferences. Partisanship relates to the influence of political 
conditions and electoral incentives. In the Texas-led challenge to DAPA, 
twenty-six of the twenty-seven plaintiff-states have Republican 
governors.254 Most have both Republican governors and attorney 
generals. The telling exception is Nevada. Nevada’s Attorney General 
252. For further discussion between the convergence of substantive and procedural
norms in the social scientific study of legitimacy, see TYLER, OBEY, supra note 58, at 25; 
TYLER, COOPERATE, supra note 58, at 34–35; see also Fallon’s three strands of legitimacy and 
theoretical debates, supra Part II. 
253. State-by-state rankings of immigrant policy climate are summarized in
independent analysis and the published studies. See RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., supra note 93, at 12; 
Pham & Van, supra note 93, at 32; infra note 253–256. 
254. The party line-up in a single lawsuit should not be overly parsed since some states
refrain from filing suit based on arbitrary considerations (such as missed deadlines), but other 
research validates that partisanship matters to immigration policy. See Alex Rogers, Partisan 
Lines Drawn in Congress Over Immigration, TIME (Jan. 27, 2015), http://time.com/3684956/ 
congress-immigration-funding/; Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 90, at 73, 74–76; S. 
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in 
Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1431, 1440, 1469 (2012). 
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and Governor are both Republicans, though the Governor is more 
moderate. The Attorney General signed on to the lawsuit against the 
Governor’s wishes. The overt partisanship in Texas v. United States is 
troubling because, unlike substantive policy differences, it crowds out 
legality and legitimacy entirely. It is naked politics, not policy. There 
should be space for a President to express policies consistent with his 
party’s positions—that is, for President Obama to affirm Democratic 
policies on immigration. States with opposing views can disagree, but 
their disagreement should not automatically impede their cooperation as 
it may in partisan politics. The plaintiff-states should be able to cooperate 
with DAPA if they believe the President is acting in good faith and the 
policy is respectable, even if they disagree with its substance and even 
with the political climate in Congress and the campaign for a new 
president. 
Some concluding observations about the complex interrelationship 
of legitimacy, legality, and morality emerge from comparing Texas v. 
United States with driver’s licenses and the shadow case studies of higher 
education and health care. First, legality operates alongside legitimacy. It 
can sometimes be such a strong constraint that it forestalls variations in 
states’ perceptions of legitimacy. This seems to be true for both the 
ACA’s express exclusion of DACA and the constitutional dimensions in 
the Texas v. United States challenge that raise concerns about process for 
enacting DAPA or the motives of the President. But legality usually 
assists or erodes legitimacy without deciding it. Second, a state’s 
substantive policy preferences are not an insurmountable barrier to 
cooperation, nor is substantive agreement a guarantee of state 
cooperation. States’ openness to immigrants varies along multiple 
measures, but there is overwhelming state acceptance of DACA for 
driver’s licenses (forty-eight to two), modest state support for access to 
higher education (twenty to three or eighteen to three), and less state 
support for state-run health care (California/Medi-Cal). The twenty-six 
states who signed up to be plaintiffs in Texas v. United States are not all 
anti-immigrant, nor are the fifteen states who signed the amicus curiae 
brief in favor of the Obama Administration pro-immigrant, according to 
independent measures of state immigration policies. A third observation 
is that the opposition to DAPA in Texas v. United States skews strongly 
by partisanship (twenty-six Republican-led plaintiff-states and fifteen 
Democrat-led states as amicus curiae for the Obama Administration),255 
255. Again, it is important not to make too much of the imbalance of state
representation, even if the plaintiff-states outnumber the states who have supported the Obama 
Administration by filing amicus briefs. Some States Stay Silent on Lawsuit Over Obama’s 
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whereas the states implementing DACA through their policies on higher 
education, health care, and driver’s licenses are not nearly as partisan.256 
The contrast of the litigation with the state policy studies distinguishes 
morality in the sense of policy from partisanship and politics. 
Comparing state reception to a wider array of executive actions 
would further parse the influence of procedural legitimacy, substantive 
policy preferences, and partisanship. For example, deferred action 
programs that offer relief from removal to non-priority immigrants 
represent only one side of the proverbial coin in immigration 
enforcement. The other side of the coin is the prioritization of immigrants 
for removal.257 The 2014 Johnson priorities memo elevates the risk of 
removing criminal aliens and recent border-crossers; it does not only 
lower the risk for DACA and DAPA eligible immigrants. The Secure 
Communities program and its successor Priority Enforcement Program 
(PEP) target law enforcement resources toward practices that raise 
deportation rates for jailed immigrants who meet the high priority 
categories. The linkages between the ability to prioritize some 
deportations by preserving resources dedicated to the removal of non-
priority cases are being emphasized in the wake of a public outcry over 
an undocumented immigrant killing an innocent bystander shortly after 
being released into the community rather than transferred to ICE for 
priority deportation.258 Although comparisons of state support for 
executive action in these very different enforcement regimes is 
preliminary, given the research design used in this comparative case 
study, the foundation for a more robust comparison of state reception to 
Immigration Actions, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/11/states-lawsuit-obama-immigration_n_6653274.html (listing 
non-meaningful reasons states have not joined the amicus in support of the U.S. government, 
e.g., missing filing deadlines).
256. Based on a comparison of the three case studies in this Article, the states at the
extreme ends of the spectrum (California, Texas, and Arizona) exhibit stable compliance 
behaviors across policies; these compliance behaviors also accord with independent indices 
of “immigrant climate” and suggest partisan influence. States in the middle of the spectrum 
(Florida and Nevada) fluctuate across the policies in this study and the immigrant climate 
index, suggesting weaker partisan influence. See RODRÍGUEZ ET AL., supra note 93, at 12; 
Pham & Van, supra note 93, at 32. These empirical findings can be considered alongside the 
theoretical claims in Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 
1081 (2014) (states check federal government by channeling partisan conflict). 
257. See David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement is Not Just for Restrictionists:
Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL. 411, 432 
(2015). 
258. Rose Cuison Villazor & Kevin R. Johnson, The Problem is Federal Immigration
Policy, Not Local Sanctuary Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/09/should-immigrant-sanctuary-laws-be-
repealed/the-problem-is-federal-immigration-policy-not-local-sanctuarylaws. 
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pro- or anti-immigrant executive actions is laid in research studying state 
reception to Secure Communities across a critical sample of states who 
supported or opposed it and made similar findings.259 
The litigation over DAPA sharpens the distinctions between 
legitimacy, morality, and its related forms: policy, politics, and 
partisanship. A state’s legitimacy concerns and its substantive beliefs 
intertwine. For example, a state can incorporate its sense that 
humanitarian relief such as DACA or DAPA is “the right thing to do” 
into its state policies, thereby merging the influences of policy, morality, 
and legality and blurring the distinctive contributions of each. This 
conflation characterizes much of the politicized rhetoric around DAPA. 
It should not be conflated in court. Legitimacy and morality can also 
counter each other. The district court in the Texas v. United States 
litigation maintains that legality alone explains its opposition to 
DAPA.260 This seems implausible.261 Their legal argument might include 
legitimacy insofar as they doubt the validity of executive authority or 
morality insofar as they believe the President is faithfully exercising good 
policy judgment on immigration. Legitimacy matters in combination with 
morality-based considerations, just as it matters in combination with 
legality. State mistrust of the President’s motives for using executive 
action rather than waiting on legislative reform constitutes a breach of 
trust that might by itself account for their opposition. 
Summing up Part IV.A on legitimacy’s relationship to legality and 
Part IV.B on legitimacy’s relationship to morality: all three 
considerations matter, in complicated ways, but the importance of 
legitimacy as a factor in state cooperation is evident throughout. This 
scholarly finding offers lessons for policymakers, which are pursued in 
the Article’s conclusion. 
259. Chen, supra note 197. Other research suggests that additional considerations for
these comparisons might include the cost to the state for the program, the size of the 
immigrant population and other demographics, presence of Latino voters, and state 
proximity to the border. Rogers, supra note 254; Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 90, at 
74, 77–78; Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 254, at 1433, 1484. 
260. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-
40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257. 
261. The Fifth Circuit’s dissent shares the view that the lower court conflates law and
politics. Texas, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *50–51. 
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CONCLUSION 
Executive action in immigration law will persist, regardless of 
whether President Obama’s deferred action programs are eventually ruled 
lawful by the Supreme Court and even if Congress or the next presidential 
administration acts to roll back the programs. This Article urges a focus 
on legitimacy, including its complex relationship to legality, rather than 
unremitting concern for legality. While challenges to the legality of 
Obama’s executive actions in immigration law proceed in court, this 
Article has presented evidence that states generally deem federal policy 
legitimate when they voluntarily enact state policies that incorporate 
DACA lawful presence designations, even though Texas v. United States 
paints a portrait of vehement skepticism of DAPA. If experience holds, it 
will take a lot to overcome states’ willingness to cooperate with the 
DACA and DAPA executive actions once given the opportunity. 
So far we know that the general trend of state support for DACA is 
enduring. Fifty of fifty states offer driver’s licenses to DACA recipients, 
notwithstanding Texas’s contention that driver’s licenses impose 
unwelcome costs on the state. Empirical evidence of the diffusion of state 
driver’s license policies shows that the adoption is neither uniform nor 
monolithic: despite the seeming consensus, the state policies providing 
driver’s licenses to DACA recipients vary over a spectrum of attitudes 
and cooperative behaviors. While some states eagerly embrace DACA’s 
lawful presence designation, others accept it provisionally and some 
begrudgingly, only under the threat of legal sanction. But the trend is 
toward embracing DACA in state policies. Versions of the same trend 
arise from a shadow case study of state higher education policies. The 
shadow case study of health care shows the limits of state acceptance, 
with only a handful of states finding ways to enact inclusionary policies 
for DACA recipients under the ACA’s legal constraints. Yet across the 
policy arenas, in-depth case studies reveal that cooperative policymaking 
is a dynamic process motivated by a sense of DACA as being legitimate 
despite contention about legality, morality, and politics. 
The Texas challenge to DAPA does not by itself change the analysis 
suggested by experience. Texas v. United States amplifies the 
complicated relationship between legitimacy and legality. It does so by 
raising a critical test case involving more legal contestation and stronger 
policy objection, where legality abuts legitimacy. States are tasked with 
sorting out their perceptions of the continuing legitimacy of the program 
in the face of legal contestation. Similarly, the policy design decisions 
surrounding DAPA’s more expansive contemplated alternative (deferred 
action for parents of DACA recipients, beyond parents of U.S. citizens 
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and LPRs) illustrates that policy, politics, and legitimacy are also related. 
Still, the paramount importance of legitimacy remains for these programs 
of executive action—especially if they rely on a scheme of cooperative 
policymaking that involves voluntary state cooperation—unless and until 
the legal dispute becomes grave enough to overcome the presumption of 
institutional legitimacy. The relationship between legitimacy, legality, 
and morality is more complex and interrelated. Sometimes legitimacy is 
bounded by legality; other times legitimacy trumps legality. Sometimes 
legitimacy and legality become intermingled. 
Once the dust settles on the legality of the newly-created DAPA 
program, a few outcomes are possible: (1) DAPA is found legal, and 
states cooperate with its implementation because it is legitimate; (2) 
DAPA is found legal, and states choose not to cooperate once it is 
implemented because it is not legitimate; (3) DAPA is found illegal for 
curable reasons such as an APA procedural violation, and states 
cooperate because they believe the program remains legitimate once 
these defects are cured; or (4) DAPA is found illegal for curable reasons 
such as an APA procedural violation, and states choose not to cooperate 
even once the defects are cured. States might also follow the law 
involuntarily, as did Arizona, following the federal court’s insistence 
after Brewer.262 Of course, if DAPA is found illegal on constitutional 
grounds or for reasons that provoke grave doubt over its procedural 
fairness, states will lack the opportunity to cooperate since DAPA will 
not go into effect. Based on legitimacy research and this study of state 
cooperation, the Article finds the cooperative outcomes more likely than 
their non-cooperative counterparts. 
262. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. II, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014), remanded to 81 F.
Supp. 3d 795 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
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Figure 3: Outcomes following DAPA litigation 
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However, state cooperation is not assured even if the DAPA 
program is found lawful and permitted to be implemented. State decisions 
will turn on their attitudes toward the legal authorities granting 
recognition to deferred action recipients and administering the 
applications. Those seeking to preserve the executive action must build 
public support for their policy to survive on-the-ground.263 It might not 
be necessary to roll back DAPA to preserve DACA in the states (as a 
matter of voluntary cooperation), but it might be necessary to change the 
implementation procedures to demonstrate procedural legitimacy even if 
not legally required to do so. Some ideas to shore up legitimacy after the 
shake-up of litigation include gathering community input, following APA 
rulemaking procedures,264 enforcing the high priority categories for 
removal,265 or publicizing discretionary departures from the guidance 
criteria and other sincere efforts to enforce immigration law.266 A 
263. For example, President Obama made several speeches supporting his programs in
their early months, usually in strategically-selected locales where the public required 
convincing about its normative and procedural legitimacy. States and localities are also doing 
this work at the initiative of mayors and congressmen’s immigration forums. See Kirk Semple, 
De Blasio to Host Mayors at Immigration Forum, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/nyregion/de-blasio-to-host-mayors-at-immigration-
forum.html; Press Release, Congressman David Cicilline, Gutierrez Hold Public Forum on 
President’s Executive Order on Immigration (Jan. 15, 2015), http://cicilline.house.gov/press-
release/cicilline-gutierrez-hold-public-forum-president%E2%80%99s-executive-order-
immigration.  
264. Rulemaking is not required after Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1203 (2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)(2014)), even if it might be advisable. 
265. The Obama Administration’s defenses of deferred action have been coupled with
its overall removal rates and especially high-priority removals under programs such as Secure 
Communities for this reason. Falling rates of deportation since the November 2014 
prosecutorial discretion memo or high-profile refusals to deport (e.g., the Kathryn Steinle 
murder by a felon released in San Francisco after repeated removals and re-entries), which 
have been noted by some critics, could weaken the credibility of the DACA and DAPA 
program. See e.g., Martin, supra note 257, at 424, 426–27. 
266. The American Immigration Lawyers’ Association and American Immigration
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symbolic but potentially significant move that would parallel Obama’s 
efforts to build legitimacy for Secure Communities might be to revise the 
parameters or replace the underlying program under the banner of a new 
name—for example, by revisiting and clarifying the benefits associated 
with DAPA.267 These research-backed proposals reflect that, beyond 
eliciting legal compliance, the President should set his sights high by 
cultivating voluntary cooperation with his executive actions. He should 
do so in the places that trust him least and even if it is not legally required. 
The President’s initial reticence about moving forward with 
executive action and his continuing exhortation for Congress to take the 
next step by enacting comprehensive legislation that promotes 
legalization and ameliorates the longstanding undocumented 
population—even as he consistently asserts the legality of his executive 
actions in court—reveals his keen understanding of the vulnerability of 
relying on executive action. Executive action is quick to enact; it is also 
quick to undo or alter and vulnerable to challenge. Most obviously, 
executive actions can be overturned by Congress or a future president. 
Executive action through agency guidance is also burdened by a chronic 
legitimacy crisis268 that is exacerbated by acute partisan divides. 
Challenges to executive actions in other areas of immigration law as well 
as environmental law, consumer protection law, and health law suggest 
that these vulnerabilities are not peculiar to DACA or immigration law at 
large. For all of these reasons, executive action is a second- or third-best 
means for crafting immigration law—second to Congress, and third to 
notice and comment rulemaking—even if it does have advantages. H. L. 
A. Hart once stated that “law” consists of a range of practices that have
become normatively binding in the affected community, whether their
source be in legal text, judicial decisions, or behavioral conventions that
have achieved general acceptance.269 In other words, general acceptance
legitimates the law. Even if executive action on immigration is not the
preferred means of policy-making, it is a viable means of advancing
policy and it can be an effective one, provided that it can obtain on-the-
ground acceptance of its legitimacy and voluntary cooperation.
Council have issued calls for examples of these discretionary departures. 
267. Secure Communities, a federal program whereby ICE requests local law
enforcement to detain immigrants believed to be removable for transfer of custody to ICE, 
was replaced by a milder Priority Enforcement Program in November 2014 because Secure 
Communities had lost legitimacy in communities.  
268. FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 11–12; see also Part I.C.
269. HART, supra note 80, at 48–49 (described in HAROLD BRUFF, UNTRODDEN
GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 7 (2015)). 
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Figure 4: State Policies and Texas v. United States Parties 
270. States chosen for top 10 population DACA-eligible and within-case
considerations. 
271. Empty circle indicates a state with inclusive license policy toward DACA
recipients; mixed circle is ID with doubt about their policy; closed circle indicates resistance 
or involuntary cooperation. 
272. Empty circle indicates state laws granting in-statute tuition; mixed circle indicates
admission but no state law granting in-state tuition; closed circle indicates no admission or 
bar on in-state tuition.   
273. Empty circle indicates state support for DACA recipients (despite restrictive
federal law); mixed circle indicates support for pregnant women or children; closed circle 
indicates no non-emergency support.  
274. Empty circle indicates that the state filed as amicus curiae on behalf of the US
government; mixed circle indicates split leadership or no legal affiliation (neutral); closed 
circle indicates joining as plaintiff. 
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